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INTRODUCTION: STATES INCREASINGLY FIND
IT DIFFICULT TO SOLVE THEIR OWN, BUT
ONLY THEIR OWN, WASTE PROBLEMS
No state wants to become a dumping ground for everyone else's t-sh,
yet all states are obligated to manage, at least to some extent, their own
citizens' trash. The United States Supreme Court, however, beginning in
1994-951
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1978 with City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey' and continuing in 1992
and 1994 with four strong extensions of the Philadelphia ruling,2 has
indicated that attempts to prevent privately owned disposal facilities from
serving out-of-state waste interests on the same terms as in-state interests
will almost always run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.3
The Court in Philadelphia relied upon flawed reasoning.4 A state's
waste management efforts should not be invalidated under the dormant
Commerce Clause if those efforts are directed at the state's cost to ensure
proper disposal of its own citizens' waste.5 The practical assumption of
this Article, however, is that the Court will not soon overrule four strong
waste precedents decided in the last three terms.6 States, for the foresee-
' 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) ("Philadelphia') (holding that a New Jersey law
prohibiting importation of waste generated outside of New Jersey was discriminatory in
effect and on its face); see infra notes 36-76 and accompanying text (discussing facts and
reasoning in Philadelphia).
' See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
112 S. Ct. 2019, 2028 (1992) ("Fort Gratiot") (holding that a statute banning import of
solid waste without county authorization violated the Commerce Clause); Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2016 (1992) ("ChemWaste') (holding that
additional fee charged for disposal of hazardous waste generated out-of-state was
impermissible under the Commerce Clause); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Oregon Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1355 (1994) ("Oregon DEQ") (invalidating surcharge on
out-of-state garbage as facially discriminatory); C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1680 (1994) ("C&A Carbone") (holding that a flow control
ordinance requiring solid waste to be processed for a fee at a designated transfer station
violated the Commerce Clause); see also infra notes 77-101 and accompanying text
(discussing Fort Gratiot); infra notes 102-20 and accompanying text (discussing
ChemWaste); infra notes 121-63 and accompanying text (discussing Oregon DEQ); inra
notes 164-222 and accompanying text (discussing C&A Carbone).
' Although the Constitution speaks only of congressional power to affinmatively
regulate commerce, the Court has long recognized an implied restriction on states' power
to act. See, e.g., Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1349. States are not absolutely prohibited
from acting just because Congress has chosen to refrain from using its power to act
Instead, the Court has developed balancing tests and presumptions to determine when
state action might be prohibited under this implied restriction. Such judicial analysis is
often referred to as dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
4 Stanley E. Cox, Bwying Misconceptions About Trash and Commerce: Why It Is
Time to Dump Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 813 (1991) (arguing that
Philadelphia should be overruled because it incorrectly considered Irash to be a consumer
commodity instead of a regulated stream and because the Commerce Clause should not
compel one state to shoulder the burden of another state's waste).
5 See id.
6 In a forthcoming article, the author plans to use this decade's waste and Commerce
Clause cases as a springboard to fully criticize the Court's general dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. In the author's opinion, the Court has articulated and applied
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able future, will be stuck with significant dormant Commerce Clause
impediments to acting as they wish - especially in regard to out-of-state
generated trash.
Taking this reality into account, this Article uses the Kentucky waste
situation as a specific example of state efforts to regulate trash. Kentucky,
like many states, responded to perceived waste problems by revising
some of its waste statutes and enacting additional measures to help the
state manage its own, but only its own, waste.7 The products of the 1991
Special Session of the Kentucky legislature are now necessarily outdated
because of the current flow of waste and Commerce Clause cases, and all
Kentucky statutes of even older vintage are similarly untested by the
Court's most recent rulings. This Article attempts to determine how much
of the Kentucky waste program is still valid in light of what the United
States Supreme Court has decided since early 1991.
Kentucky's situation is an example of how significant political
pressures can cause states to walk close to and sometimes over the
constitutional line when attempting to deal with the problems caused by
out-of-state waste. One "solution" to the strictures imposed by the
dormant Commerce Clause would be for the Court to loosen that
con'titutional noose.' The Court, however, as its most recent decisions
strongly indicate, steadfastly has resisted all efforts to carve out any
"waste" exceptions to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Under current
Court tests, only those state regulatory efforts which impose evenhanded
burdens on the local citizenry rather than serve as a pretext for discrimi-
nation against out-of-state waste stand a reasonable chance of surviving
constitutional attack. Generally, these tests mean that true, rather than
pretextual, market participation and evenhanded rigorous regulation of all
waste in a government's boundaries should survive dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny. Other measures, despite their political appeal, are likely
to be found unconstitutional under the Court's current precedents.
The rest of this Article develops these conclusions in greater detail.
Part I explains why states, including Kentucky, resist the burdens
imposed by their own waste, but even more especially, by out-of-state
inappropriate dormant Commerce Clause tests. State regulations should be evaluated on
the basis of whether they further legitimate state action at the regulating state's cost
without impinging on truly national interests. The current focus on the extent to which
private business interests are burdened undervalues the state's need to regulate. Any form
of such substantive economic due process should have been disposed of properly in the
mid-twentieth century and should not be recycled through the dormant Commerce Clause.
7 See infra notes 31-35, 223-80 and accompanying text.
'See supra notes 4, 6.
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waste." Part II analyzes the Court's waste decisions, emphasizing that the
Court generally will declare unconstitutional the sort of "shortcut"
regulatory measures which states politically would prefer to adopt in
order to address the burdens imposed by out-of-state waste.1" Part HI
examines the Kentucky waste situation in light of this constitutional
landscape - first addressing local control issues and then evaluating
whether specific local and statewide measures would violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. The Article concludes that states should regulate
evenhandedly and/or at real cost in order to survive attacks brought under
currently controlling dormant Commerce Clause precedents.'
I. STATES Do NOT WANT TO FULLY SOLVE
THEiR OWN WASTE PROBLEMS AND CERTAINLY
Do NOT WANT OTHERS' BURDENS
A. Waste Costs Are Externalized and Ultimately Borne by Those
Nearest the Disposal Site
In a perfectly equitable world, it might seem reasonable that states
would wish to impose on waste generators the full burdens of their waste
generation. 3 We do not live in a theoretical world; we live in a world
' See infra notes 13-35 and accompanying text. For farther discussion of the
pressures which produce waste problems, see, e.g., Alice J. Mansell, Note, North Dakota
Enters the Dumping Ground War: A Case Study for Incentive-Based Regulations, 69
N.D. L. REv. 575 (1993); Jonathan P. Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis:
Increased Federal Involvement a a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste
Disposal, 79 GEO L.J. 567 (1990-1991).
10 See infra notes 36-222 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 223-300 and accompanying text.
12 See infra pp. 628-29.
- Cf. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("In sum, the law
simply incorporates the common sense notion that those responsible for a problem should
be responsible for its solution to the degree they are responsible for the problem but not
further."). The thrust of the Chief Justice's point - that the Commerce Clause should not
be read to impose on other states the burdens of waste disposal which the generating
states themselves have been unwilling to bear - is correct. However, this Article
emphasizes that no state or locality has yet fully assumed responsibility for the problems
it has created. The Court implicitly uses this fact of extemalization in its donnant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence to turn Rehnquist's logic around. Implicit in the
majority's economic protectionist arguments in several high profile cases, see infra notes
43-162 and accompanying text, is the notion that a state may regulate against the
externalized costs of out-of-state or out-of-area trash only to the extent that the state itself
has assumed these costs or assessed them against particular citizens. In contrast to
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where every citizen generates significant amounts of waste,14 where
efforts to discourage manufacturers from creating products which end up
as waste are embraced halfheartedly if at all, 5 and where many of the
costs of waste generation are not borne directly by those who put their
trash into receptacles.'6 It is quite predictable that if the full burdens of
waste generation are not imposed on those who generate waste, then
generators will pass these burdens on to others who will seek to pass
them on to yet others. At some point down the waste chain, the recipients
of these waste spillover costs can be expected to resist the imposition.
Theoretically, the excess and externalized costs could be picked up or
fully subsidized by government. The underlying economic and factual
reality, however, is that states, just as they hesitate at the front end to
impose the full costs of disposal on those who generate waste, also
seldom, if ever, wish to fully absorb the costs of even their own citizens'
waste generation at the back end.
The predictable result of this dual private enterprise and government
avoidance of the full costs of waste generation is that significant spillover
costs of waste generation are imposed where waste is finally deposited.
The reality of toxic pollution catastrophes at waste disposal sites is what
led to the creation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 7 also known as "Super-
fund.""8 Although the reality of potential CERCLA clean-up liability has
required increased internalization of the costs associated with producing
wastes,'9 the full costs of waste generation and disposal are still far from
Relmquist's statement, the majority might say: Our domant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence reflects the notion that a state wishing to impose costs on others who have
contributed to a problem may impose those costs only to the degree that the state fully
has addressed its own part of the same problem.
"4 See, e.g., PAUL KALOJIAN, U.S. ENV L. PROTECTON AGENCY, CHARAcrERIZATION
OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN TnE UNrTED STATES (1990).
" See, e.g., MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE TASK FORCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTON
AGENCY, THE SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 6-7 (1989).
16 See, e.g., KALOJIAN, supra note 14.
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
" See, e.g., Bulk Distribution Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441
& n.10 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (referring to CERCLA as "Superfimd" and describing the genesis
of the program); Stephen Feldman, Comment, CERCLA Liability, Where It Is and Where
It Should Not Be Going: The Possibility of Liability Release for Environmentally
Beneficial Land Transfers, 23 ENVrL. L. 295, 297 (1993) (referring to the Superfimd
program).
, The courts have interpreted § 107 of CERCLA as imposing minimal causation
requirements on goverment seeking to recover for costs of remediation associated with
a CERCLA site and as permitting joint and several liability recovery against any party
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fully internalized. Waste disposal is a business where even those firms
and businesses most worried about future liability must still compete
against others willing to shortcut environmental protection in favor of
short-term profits. Waste sites may have become profitable enterprises,
but they are still, as Chief Justice Rehnquist has correctly noted,
legitimately undesirable neighbors'
B. The NTMBY Syndrome Implies Relative Political Powerlessness and
Shifted Burdens
Since the costs of waste disposal are not sufficiently internalized, the
political battle focuses on who will have to bear the insufficiently
compensated costs at the end of the waste disposal chain. In this regard
everyone is a NIMBY,2' for nobody welcomes the imposition of waste
burdens which are inadequately compensated. It is no accident that waste
who contributed wastes to the site which might have in turn contributed to the cleam-up
problem. See ZYGMUNT PLATER Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoucY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOcETY 260-300 (1992) (discussing approaches taken by courts in the
environmental law area). The desired result of this fear of CERCLA liability is increased
care in the handling and disposal of wastes.
" It is no secret why capacity is not expanding sufficiently to meet de-
mand - the substantial risks attendant to waste sites make them extraordinarily
unattractive neighbors. The result, of course, is that while many are willing to
generate waste - indeed, it is a practical impossibility to solve the waste
problem by banning waste production - few are willing to help dispose of it.
Those locales that do provide disposal capacity to serve foreign waste
effectively are affording reduced environmental and safety risks to the States
that will not take charge of their own waste.
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
21 The acronym stands for "Not In My BackYard" and usually carries with it an
undeservedly pejorative connotation. See, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, '"IMBY" Is a
National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L. REv. 198, 198 (1990) (explaining that
NIMBY is a syndrome characterized by efforts to exclude unwanted programs and
facilities from a group's locale). It is easy for those NIMBYs who have successfully
avoided having to face all the costs associated with their own waste disposal to sneer at
those NIMBYs who refuse to accept the costs thus passed on. After all, if the waste has
to go somewhere, those who resist its final deposition are being unreasonable, are they
not? So does the pot call the kettle black. Compare the opinion of the Chief Justice:
The result is that the Court today gets it exactly backward when it suggests that
Alabama is attempting to "isolate itself from a problem common to the several
States." To the contrary, it is the 34 States that have no hazardous waste facility
whatsoever, not to mention the remaining 15 States with facilities all smaller
than Emelle, that have isolated themselves.
ChemWaste, 112 S. Ct. at 2018 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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disposal facilities traditionally have been sited in rural, economically
depressed, or otherwise relatively politically powerless areas." Since the
waste has to go somewhere, the politically or economically more
powerful dictate the end location. The town dump, like any undesirable
facility, traditionally is located on the other side of the tracks. Nor do the
city fathers desire to give the residents near the proposed town dump veto
power over its siting, because the waste (despite its costs not being
sufficiently internalized) has to go somewhere.
C. The Rise of the Interstate Waste Market Both Exemplifies and
Exacerbates Cost Externalization
While CERCLA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA")' do not require waste generation to completely pay for its
own disposal, they have significantly increased the costs of disposal.'
For several reasons, these increased costs have led to disposal facilities
which are larger and usually more regional or national in scope. First, the
significantly increased engineering costs associated with the landfilling of
even common household garbage" mean that small facilities are no
2 See, e.g., The NIMBY Symdrome in the 1990's: Where Do You Go Afler Getting
to No?, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 132 (May 4, 1990). More generally, recent increased
attention has been paid to the situation of having the problems of environmental pollution
aimed at those who are perceived as politically powerless. See, e.g., Regina Austin &
Michael Schell, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned- Minority Grassroots Environmentalism
and the Quest for ?-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 69 (1991); Vicki Been, What's
Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable
Land Uses, 6 CORNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993); Robert D. Bullard, In Our Backyards, 18
EPA J. 11 (1992); Kelly M. Colquette & Elizabeth A. Henry Robertson, Environmental
Racism: The Causes, Consequences and Commendation, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 153 (1991);
Richard J. Lazaras, Pursuing "Environmental Justice". The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant,
Race, Poverty and the Environment, 18 EPA J. 6 (1992); Rachel D. Grodsil, Note,
Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 394 (1991); Marianne LaVelle &
Marcia Coyle, The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at
51.
"3 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
2 See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 8102 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 260).
2 Household garbage is part of what RCRA calls municipal solid waste ("MSW").
It would be a mistake to assume that MSW is non-hazardous. Although exempt from the
more rigorous RCRA Subtitle C regulations which govern hazardous waste, MSW's
exemption is by definition rather than because of the constituents of the waste. In fact
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") evidence and the RCRA requirements for
disposal indicate that the hazards associated with MSW disposal are similar to those
involved in hazardous waste disposal. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 257, 258 (1994).
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longer viable. The county dump is thus increasingly a thing of the past,
as economies of scale require or encourage regional facilities. As a
corollary to this need for economies of scale, governmental units with
smaller population bases may find it not only impossible to operate a
facility on their own (i.e., using only their citizens' waste to sustain
operation of the facility), but also difficult to cooperate with other
governmental units to pool their trash. Finally, the potential CERCLA
liability for operating a disposal facility, while not fully capturing
spillover costs, is nevertheless something many governments desire to
avoid rather than embrace. Whereas the county dumps of the past may
not have suspected they were potential Superfund sites, current city,
township, and county waste managers are definitely aware of the dangers
attendant to being a waste disposal facility.26
As explained above, political powers responsible for disposing of
community-generated waste disproportionately impose the burdens of
waste on those at or near the waste facility. The town dump is imposed
on those who have no significant clout in the town. But at least when the
town dump disposes of only town-generated garbage, the burdens of the
dump are imposed within the governmental unit which created those
burdens. Viewed at the governmental boundary level, the waste costs are
not externalized; the burdens will be felt by the community, albeit
disproportionally within that community. When communities stop
operating disposal facilities, however, and export their waste to other
communities, the burdens of waste disposal begin to lose this one-to-one
correspondence between waste and the governmental unit traditionally
responsible for waste management. An interstate waste market necessarily
presupposes no correspondence of benefits and burdens between the
government of the people who generated the waste and the government
of the people who will feel its externalized burdens.
This lack of correspondence between governmental waste generators
and disposal facilities has several important implications. First, from the
generator's point of view, the incentive to distribute waste disposal
burdens across the waste-generating governmental population has
decreased even more. All of the externalized costs of waste disposal
are now headed out of the political unit. The only constraints on waste
export thus become economic rather than a combination of economic and
2 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1205 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that CERCLA does not contain exceptions to liability for municipalities).
27 A local government which operated a dump for town waste might at least have
argued, albeit not too persuasively, that disproportionate property taxes helped offset some
of the burdens of waste disposal.
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political limitations." But under RCRA and CERCLA, since the costs
of waste disposal have dramatically increased, the economics now favor
exportation more often than when disposal was primarily a local
operation and the main costs were thought to be more in the nature of
nuisance than potential Superfund liability. Thus, generating communities
have positive incentive to ship waste out in order to avoid political and
environmental liability, and they find that it is often not too expensive to
do so.
At the other end of the waste stream, eliminating correspondence
between government populations which generate waste and those who
bear externalized disposal burdens causes increased governmental
resistance to proposed facility siting within the government boundaries.
Under a town dump regime, part of the rationale for siting the dump
within the town is that the town's waste has to go somewhere. No similar
governmental necessity argues on behalf of facilities designed to take
other governments' waste. The arguments in favor of siting a disposal
facility which takes primarily out-of-area waste become solely economic,
while the arguments against local siting are both economic and political.
Since those dumped upon are local voters, while those proposing to ship
waste in are not, local government probably favors its constituents
when it opposes a disposal facility.
The pressure on government to oppose siting intensifies for additional
reasons. Increased economies of scale and waste exportation mean
literally that more burden bears down on whatever community hosts a
disposal site. Those most directly affected understandably scream more
loudly when the proposed site is a mega-landfill rather than just a town
dump."0 Additionally, resistance is broadened, since marginal supporters
' While relatively without clout, those dumped on by their own community can still
vote, and if the dumping becomes too excessive, those who allow the dumping run the
risk that their political careers will be of short tenure.
' The disposal facility will, of course, have local advocates who would benefit from
local siting in the form of profits or increased jobs. But the point of the argument
throughout this part of the text is that the externalized costs of disposal are always greater
than whatever the waste industry operation charges for its services. In such circumstances,
where spillover costs have not been internalized, those who bear the spillover costs have
the potential to politically outweigh those who will receive the benefit of waste industry
dollars.
30 Because it was the small town dumps of yesterday which have become the
Superfund sites of today, it could be argued that the state-of-the-art mega landfills of
today do not present the same degree of danger as past facilities and therefore should not
be vehemently opposed. However, the perceived, non-internalized costs of current
disposal, not the unrecognized costs of prior disposal, motivate resistance. If yesteryear's
1994-95]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of a siting involving locally generated waste (because "their" waste needs
to go somewhere) can easily become marginal or even vociferous
opponents of a site which adds burdens to the community as a whole.
To summarize, RCRA/CERCLA waste -management increases
disposal costs and creates pressure for increased economies of scale.
Small-scale government operations become impractical, while the
economics of long-distance export are not necessarily prohibitive. As
waste is exported and increasingly processed for disposal by private
enterprise rather than governments, burdens become more focused on
communities whose populace did not generate and do not want the waste
involved. The predictable resulting political pressure to oppose waste
facility sitings and/or waste import is what has generated and will
continue to generate regulation which industry challenges under the
dormant Commerce Clause.
D. Application to Kentucky Situation
The above points seem borne out in the Kentucky experience.
Kentucky statutes generally give Kentucky counties the primary
responsibility for planning for waste management and grant them some,
but not complete, control over the siting and operation of disposal
facilities within their borders." The reluctance to grant localities
absolute control could be viewed in part as an intragovernmental fight
between the state as a whole, whose waste must go somewhere, and the
particular (usually rural and less politically powerful) counties which will
most likely bear externalized disposal costs. Alternatively, it could be
viewed partly as paternalistic skepticism on the part of the state environ-
mental regulatory agency that counties will properly exercise power,
given prior lax attitudes towards waste management.' Finally, the
dump did not appear so bad at the time it was being operated, severity of resistance was
only based on those incorrectly perceived harms. The fact that a modem facility is state-
of-the-art does not defeat the truth that it still does not fully protect against potential
harm. These perceived, albeit decreased risks, may be more strongly opposed than were
the unperceived, but more harmful, risks of the past.
31 See infra notes 223-80 and accompanying text (examining the contours of
Kentucky waste legislation in more detail).
31 One of the major accomplishments of the solid waste legislation passed during the
1991 Special Session was the requirement that all Kentucky counties adopt some form of
waste management program providing all residents the opportunity to dispose of their
trash through organized collection systems. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §-224.43-315
(Baldwin 1992). While the equivalent of household universal collection is still not
mandatory in Kentucky, the new legislation moved Kentucky much closer to a situation
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reluctance to institute absolute local power could also be viewed in part
as the result of lobbying by private interests (including in-state waste
developers and out-of-state disposal interests), who argued that granting
too much power to the localities would frustrate waste development
opportunities.
At the local level, and in line with the arguments above regarding
externalized costs, Kentucky environmentalists have perceived the battle
about facility siting as primarily one resulting in the politically less
powerful being dumped upon. Accordingly, the focus of groups such as
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth ("KFTC"), the Local Governance
Council, and the Kentucky Resources Council ("KRC") has been the
empowerment of those local citizens most directly affected by disposal
activities.33 In line with other of the points made previously, however,
the increased pressure for waste export has been across state lines and
also a result of economies of scale encouraging larger regional facili-
ties.' Several large-scale disposal facilities have been proposed and/or
built in Kentucky and have predictably met with opposition.35 Oppo-
where roadside, streamside, or other open dumping, while always having been illegal,
would increasingly lose its economic incentive, since local revenues often would be
required to ensure some form of collection service.
Additionally, as the author, having served as a prosecution screener for potential
environmental crimes in Kentucky, can attest many of the most poorly run landfill
operations in the state, and thus those potentially most deserving of criminal indictment
or serious civil enforcement action, were county-operated rather than privately owned.
This history of prior lax waste management at least argues for not giving localities
exclusive control over waste management.
33 This statement is especially true of the KFTC and the Local Governance Council,
which emphasize citizen lobbying over lawyer-dominated actions. The KRC, while also
providing organizational assistance to grassroots groups, is more likely to play on the state
and local level a role approximating that which the National Resources Defense Council
or Environmental Defense Ftmd plays at the national level, by considering proposals for
legal involvement on the merits and involving itself in those proposals which seem to
have the most potential for statewide environmental impact. Other Kentucky environmen-
tal groups such as the Sierra Club, Kentucky Conservation Committee, and Community
Farm Alliance have played significant legislative and lobbying roles regarding waste
issues. Particular disposal projects or problems also generate ad hoc local citizen groups
opposed to those projects or concerned about addressing problems.
' At the same time Kentucky was hoping to implement legislation to exclude out-of-
state waste, it adopted regulations which nevertheless emphasized the need for larger
regional facilities within the state because of economies of scale. See, e.g., 401 KY.
ADMIN. REGs. 47:080 (1991).
3 Some of the more notable controversies involved the Green Valley, Atwoods, and




nents of Kentucky facilities created primarily for disposal of out-of-state
long-haul trash have been not just the traditionally less politically
powerful, but also the governmental establishment itseW or at least more
broadly representative grassroots movements. This generalized political
pressure to prevent Kentucky from becoming a dumping ground for
others' waste was partly responsible for the 1991 Special Session.
Kentucky's efforts to gain control over waste streams diverted to it, like
the efforts of other states and localities, raise significant dormant
Commerce Clause issues. The remainder of this Article explores those
Commerce Clause issues at both the national and the Kentucky level in
greater detail.
II. TIE SUPREME COURT'S DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE RULINGS PLACE SIGNIFICANT
RESTRICTIONS ON A STATE'S ABILITY TO
MANAGE ITS OWN, BUT ONLY ITS OWN, WASTE
The United States Supreme Court clearly has foreclosed several
significant state options for waste control via its Philadelphia,' Fort
Gratiot,37 ChemWaste,' Oregon DEQ,39 and C&A Carbone4" rul-
ings. Each of these cases is analyzed in turn, but a brief overview is
helpful. The Philadelphia Court established that waste must be treated as
potentially protected commerce.41 Philadelphia further established that
attempts to control waste based on its origin will almost always fail
because they will be subjected to heightened scrutiny.42 Still, Philadel-
phia left many waste regulatory options open or at least undecided. Court
dicta in the Fort Gratiot and ChemWaste cases about the narrowness of
those rulings emphasized that other options for state regulation remained
available and indicated that the Court did not mean to prohibit states from
all regulation affecting out-of-state waste.43 The proper way to read the
Philadelphia, Fort Gratiot, and ChemWaste holdings is as a rejection of
fairly transparent state efforts to exclude out-of-state waste when state
36 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
3 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
38 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
39 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
- 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
41 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 621.
42Id. at 628-29.
' See, e.g., Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023; ChemWaste, 112 S. Ct. at 2015-16 &
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efforts did not impose serious waste management burdens on the state's
own citizens.
The Oregon DEQ and C&A Carbone decisions from the Court's most
recent term expanded on Philadelphia's premises. Oregon DEQ, strictly
interpreting the compensatory tax line of cases, ruled that states may not
equalize burdens imposed by out-of-state waste through fees equal to the
amount of general revenue money the state has allocated to in-state waste
burdens." The Court in C&A Carbone ruled sweepingly that states may
not tell their citizens where they must dispose of their trash.' By ruling
in both recent cases that a state may not impose incidental burdens on
interstate commerce even when seriously burdening its own citizenry with
waste management of locally generated waste, the current Court has
indicated that state regulation of garbage will receive searching scrutiny.
Though serious state regulation of interstate waste is not foreclosed by
Court precedents, states must craft their regulations carefully to survive
future dormant Commerce Clause attacks. The methods of regulation
which seem most logical to the state because they cheaply and efficiently
take care of the state's own waste problems while minimizing or
excluding out-of-state burdens are precisely the methods which the Court
is likely to find in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
A. Philadelphia Foreclosed Bans Involving Private Facilities,
Construing Such Bans As Economic Protectionism
In Philadelphia, the Court invalidated the most direct state effort to
ensure that it manages its own, but only its own, waste - a state ban on
receiving waste generated from outside the state." The Court rejected
New Jersey's arguments that waste, having negative value, did not deserve
Commerce Clause protection.47 The Court also held that the ban's effect
was impermissible economic protectionism." For purposes of evaluating
future state regulation, the Court emphasized that heightened scrutiny
would be imposed on any state enactment that treats waste differently
based on origin." The Court left open, however, the possibilities of
44 Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1355.
4s C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1680.
4437 U.S. 617. Although the New Jersey statute at issue allowed some exemptions
from the ban, the Court properly noted that these exceptions were minor and treated the
case for practical purposes as an outright ban. See id. at 618-19.
47 Id. at 621.
4Id. at 622.
49 Id. at 624.
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market exemption and evenhanded regulation; it also did not foreclose the
fact that a state's discriminatory regulation might even survive heightened
scrutiny if more compelling justification than that offered by New Jersey
could be provided.
The Philadelphia Court first rejected New Jersey's argument that
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny was not triggered by New Jersey's
trash regulations since the thing regulated, garbage, was not an article of
valuable commerce." In deciding that business related to garbage is
protected commerce, the Philadelphia Court rejected the notion that
traffic in negatively valued items5 such as trash is not commerce. By
implication, the Philadelphia Court emphasized the totality of the
business relations rather than the particular items banned. 2 The fact that
private business transactions definitely were occurring in regard to trash,
in the Court's view, triggered dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. The
Court thus read the dormant Commerce Clause expansively, giving it the
same scope of potential prohibition as if Congress attempted to regulate
under its explicit grant of Commerce Clause authority.53 Accordingly,
the Court explicitly rejected New Jersey's arguments that a more
restrictive scope to the Commerce Clause was required when the issue
was the validity of a state's actions.'
The Court similarly rejected New Jersey's arguments that the negative
value of trash made its prohibition like quarantine measures, which
survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.55 In order to be like a
quarantine measure, in the Court's view, New Jersey law would have'to
insist that all trash, regardless of origin, be immediately destroyed near
'o Id. at 621.
"I Trash has negative value in that nobody wants it; people only want to get rid of
it. As Chief Justice Rehnquist correctly argued, it is nonsensical to argue that any of the
parties in any of the waste cases are buying and selling trash, they are buying and selling
services or space for the disposal of trash. See Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028 & n.1
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
" This lack of concern about the exact article of commerce being regulated was
continued in the Fort Gratiot case. In that case, the Court emphasized that however trash
tansactions were viewed, it was clear the transactions represented potentially protected
commercial activity. Id. at 2023.
" "Just as Congress has power to regulate the interstate movement of these wastes,
States are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement."
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622-23.
' See id. at 621-22 (rejecting two-tiered definition of commerce).
" Under the quarantine cases, as the Court acknowledged, it is permissible to




its site of origin." The Court thus implicitly gave no weight to extern-
ality arguments, which are central to understanding the political realities
involved in current waste management. By rejecting New Jersey's
quarantine argument the Court implicitly rejected arguments that the
danger of trash is always felt most at its point of deposit rather than at
points higher up the waste chain, yet the only way to effectively
quarantine trash is to insist that it be deposited in disposal facilities.
By implicitly refusing to consider externalities to be of any conse-
quence, the Court more easily viewed New Jersey's actions as pure
economic protectionism. New Jersey had something - landfill capaci-
ty - which was desired by waste generators in other states. By preventing
other states' citizens from using this New Jersey resource, New Jersey
was selfishly hoarding for its own citizens' use something which should
be available to all on the open market. Thus, the Court analogized
landfills to natural resources for which a right of preferred access could
not be afforded the state's own citizens.57 The Court opined that New
Jersey's ban would result in New Jersey residents having to bear a
relatively lighter burden for disposal services than out-of-state citizens.
Whether this decreased burden was reflected in a more attractive New
Jersey environment or in fewer actual dollars spent in landflling was
irrelevant to the Court.s What mattered was that the benefits New
Jersey hoped to achieve would be obtained by imposing burdens (in the
form of lack of access) only on outsiders. 9 The Court found this
situation to be impermissible. °
Accordingly, the Philadelphia Court emphasized that for any state
regulation aimed at out-of-state trash to withstand dormant Commerce
s' See id. at 629.
-5 Id. at 627.
S" See id. at 626.
'9 Id. at 628-29 (stating that New Jersey was attempting to shift the full burden of
diminisbhin the flow of garbage to the remaining landfill space onto those out-of-state).
The Court's analysis seems misguided. See supra note 6. The real burden, given the
externalized costs associated with disposal facilities such as landfills, is having to site
them anywhere. And disposal facilities are not unique resources of which one state has
greater natural abundance than another. E.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 818-23; cf. Fort
Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2030 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "siting a modem
landfill can now proceed largely independent of the landfill location's particular geological
characteristics"). The Philadelphia Court's economic and protectionist emphasis has,
however, been explicitly followed in more recent Court "trash" precedents, e.g., C&A
Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1680, and for purposes of this Article is therefore considered
binding on any state's attempt to regulate trash.
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628-30.
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Clause scrutiny, some reason apart from origin must justify treating the
out-of-state waste differently." Moreover, the Court emphasized that
because the burdens of the regulation were felt solely by out-of-state
generators, the state's burden of showing legitimate purpose would be
significantly higher than if the regulation had operated evenhandedly and
thus had only indirectly produced higher burdens on out-of-state
interests.62
The Court clarified and enshrined a two-tiered level of Commerce
Clause scrutiny in the waste context. If a regulation operates evenhanded-
ly, then the Pike test, a potentially deferential Commerce Clause
balancing test, is employed. 3 However, "where simple economic
protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of
invalidity has been erected."" In equating New Jersey's discrimination
against out-of-state waste with economic protectionism, the Philadelphia
Court ensured that future state waste management schemes which
differentiate between waste solely on origin would almost surely be
doomed. Unfortunately, Michigan,65  Alabama," and other states,
including Kentucky,' either did not believe or did not perceive this
message.
The Philadelphia rationale of equating different treatment with
impermissible discrimination effectively prevents states from reserving
6' Id. at 626-27.
'Id.
The Court set forth the following language as embodying "the general contours"
of this "much more flexible approach":
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.
Id. at 624 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). Under this
Pike balancing test, the state regulation is presumed to be valid. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142
(stating that the state regulation "will be upheld unless the burden imposed ... is dearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits") (emphasis added).
"Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
"See infra notes 77-100 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
6See, e.g., infra notes 251-80 and accompanying text (discussing state schemes




privately owned disposal capacity primarily for their own waste manage-
ment needs. Accordingly, it is vital to understand what options Philadel-
phia left open to states which wish to bear the burden of managing their
own, but only their own, garbage. First, the Court explicitly left open
what has come to be known as the "market participant" exemption from
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny." Under this doctrine, when a state
acts as a market participant by owning and operating its own facilities, it
may favor its own residents over outsiders. A state-owned landfill
accordingly has the potential to serve only in-state waste. The more
interesting potential use of the market participant exemption would be for
a state to prohibit private competition and still claim that it had a right to
serve only its own citizens. 9
Second, the Court left open discrimination based on the type of waste
rather its than origin. For example, a state ban of all disposable diapers
or plastic milk jugs from landfills located in that state theoretically would
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause." Since the regulation would
apply to waste generated both inside and outside the state, this even-
handedness implicates the Pike balancing test and its more deferential
approach to state regulation. Even under the Pike test, however, if
burdens imposed by evenhanded regulation become clearly excessive in
comparison to local benefits, and/or if the local benefits could be
achieved by clearly less discriminatory alternatives, then the local
regulation may still be struck down under the dormant Commerce
Clause.7 Thus, to predict the constitutionality of particular types of
evenhanded regulation, one must assess the putative benefits, the likely
effects on the out-of-state waste industry, and the possibility of achieving
similar benefits by alternative means. State efforts which achieve
significant local benefit at significant local cost should withstand
Commerce Clause scrutiny even if they also frustrate out-of-state desires
for access to cheap disposal sites.7
' "We express no opinion about New Jersey's power, consistent with the Commerce
Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state-owned resources ... or New Jersey's
power to spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents and businesses.
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627 n.6 (citations omitted).
9 See infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text (exploring the constitutional
possibilities for such exclusive state ownership of disposal facilities).
" Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (holding that a
ban on the sale of milk in plastic containers did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
or the dormant Commerce Clause).
S ee supra note 63.
See infra notes 282-300 and accompanying text.
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A third issue left undecided by the Philadelphia Court is what a state
may require of its own citizens regarding the waste they generate. States
and localities may consider it within their police power to tell their
citizens what they may and may not do with their trash, including
requiring them to deliver it to government-authorized agents or franchises
or certain disposal facilities.73 In two 1905 cases, the Court held that
such monopolistic state power was authorized under traditional police
power logic and did not violate citizens' due process rights.74 However,
in the recent C&A Carbone litigation, the Court held that such "flow
control" violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 5
Finally, the Philadelphia ruling left unanswered the propriety of
compensatory fees. A compensatory fee is one the state charges outsiders
to compensate the state for funding services it provides the outsiders.
When states institute compensatory fees on out-of-state or out-of-area
waste, the issues of how discrimination is to be determined, how much
"fit" must exist between fees and services provided, what the relationship
must be between fees charged on in-state waste and on out-of-state waste,
and for what things the state is allowed to be compensated come to the
fore. The Oregon DEQ case answered negatively some of the questions
about how states might attempt to charge compensatory fees but did not
totally foreclose such fees.76
In conclusion, the Philadelphia Court made clear that if states
discriminate against waste headed to private facilities based on origin,
such efforts will be deemed economic protectionism. The Court left open
possibilities for rigorous but evenhanded regulation and market participant
exemption, as well as compensatory fees which do no more than make
out-of-state interests pay their fair share of internalized costs. Many state
waste planners in the short run, however, found these Philadelphia waste
messages hard to stomach and attempted to craft regulatory programs
which would encourage the judiciary to cut back on the Philadelphia
ruling. These efforts met with ultimate defeat in the Fort Gratiot and
Chem Waste cases.
' See, e.g., Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1905).
'4 Gardner, 199 U.S. at 332-33 (holding that individual property rights are
subordinate to the general good); California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Wors,
199 U.S. 306, 324 (1905) (deeming all rights subject to conditions instituted by the
governing authority in order to ensure the community's well-being).
71 C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1680; see infra notes 164-222 and accompanying text
(analyzing this case and exploring the power states still have to direct their citizens' trash
after C&A Carbone).
' See infra notes 121-63 and accompanying text.
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B. Fort Gratiot Emphasized that Philadelphia's Economic
Protectionism Rationale Applies to Local Actions Which
Are Part of a Comprehensive Waste Management Plan
In two 1992 cases, Fort Gratiot and ChemWaste, the Court confirmed
the messages and rationale of Philadelphia. The fact that both cases were
decided the same day and refer to each other for parts of their analysis'
indicates the two cases should be linked for many dormant Commerce
Clause purposes.78 In both cases, states attempted to recast Philadelphia
as not in tune with modem knowledge regarding the hazards of waste
disposal and serious state efforts being made to plan for and dispose of
waste. In both cases, the Court decisively rejected these arguments as
being already included within the Philadelphia rationale and decision.
Both cases strongly reaffirmed the Philadelphia message that differential
treatment based on origin will trigger scrutiny fatal to the state, but
both cases left open the possibilities for regulation discussed pre-
viously.79
In Fort Gratiot, the challenged state regulation allowed counties to
prohibit local disposal facilities from processing any out-of-area waste.
The statute granting counties such power was part of a comprehensive
Michigan waste program designed to ensure that Michigan counties
properly disposed of waste generated within their borders." Significant-
ly, other portions of the waste legislation gave counties (the governmental
units responsible for managing waste under the statutes) the power to
override any contrary local planning and zoning laws if necessary to site
a disposal facility to meet their own needs." In other words, a county
could authorize new privately owned landfill space against local
opposition but attach to the new space the condition that the disposed
waste only come from within the county. Thus, the veto power over out-
of-area waste should be seen as encouraging counties to responsibly
7 See, e.g., ChemWaste, 112 S. Ct. at 2012-18.
n Only Justice Blackmim among the Justices saw a distinction between the two cases
meriting a different response; he voted in favor of state regulation in Fort Gratiot but
against Alabama's discriminatory fee in ChemWaste. Cf. Michael P. Healy, The
Preemption of State Hazardous and Solid Waste Regulations: The Dormant Commerce
Clause Awakens Once More, 43 J. URD. & CONTEmp. L. 177, 191 (1993) (arguing that
ChemWaste was decided properly, Fort Gratiot improperly).
" See supra notes 46-76.
'0 See Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (giving examples
of the comprehensiveness of the legislation that made the total package "quite unlike the
simple outright ban that we confronted in Philadelphid').
"' See MIcH. COMP. LAws § 299.430(4) (1984).
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dispose of their own waste by giving them incentive and power to allow
otherwise undesirable land use on condition that the externalized cost not
be greater than that created by their own citizens' waste-producing
activities.' A private landfill operator in St. Clair County, whose
request to receive out-of-area waste was rebuffed, challenged the
constitutionality of St. Clair's out-of-area ban.83
The Fort Gratiot Court considered the ban indistinguishable from the
economic protectionism declared unconstitutional in Philadelphia. The
Court reaffirmed its Philadelphia view that isolating private landfills from
the larger trash market constitutes impermissible economic protection-
ism, 4 ignoring, as Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out, both the real
costs imposed on the citizenry by siting a landfill facility in the area and
the increased literal costs that would be charged by a facility that would
operate at less than optimal economies of scale.' But to the majority,
the determinative point was that the Michigan statute, like the enactment
struck down in Philadelphia, treated out-of-area waste differently than
local waste.6 If the determinative inquiry was not whether the facts of
the legislation constituted economic protectionism but rather whether the
facts would be presumed to constitute such economic protectionism
(because the discrimination was facial), Michigan would lose this case.'
SC. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing how
the Michigan statute encouraged local responsibility for waste). The importance of having
the government bear the increased externalized costs when a landfill is sited is often
ignored by waste industry advocates. Those advocates often feel that the sole issue
involved in local waste management planning should be whether there will be adequate
disposal capacity for local area wastes (i.e., so long as the government's waste is taken
care of, what concern is it to the government if other wastes are also managed). In the
Fort Gratiot litigation, for example, the landfill operator, as part of its request for
permission to take out-of-area waste, also "promised to reserve sufficient capacity to
dispose of all solid waste generated in the county in the next 20 years." Id. at 2022.
3 Id.
" "Whe statute affords local waste producers complete protection from competition
from out-of-state waste producers who seek to use local waste disposal areas." Id. at
2024.
sS See id. at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
'
6 As the Court explained: "In view of the fact that Michigan has not identified any
reason, apart from its origin, why solid waste coming from outside the county should be
treated differently from solid waste within the county, the foregoing reasoning [from
Philadelphia] would appear to control the disposition of this case." Id. at 2024 (alteration
in original).
"' See supra note 6. Applying a heightened scrutiny test, the Fort Gratiot Court
easily determined that Michigan had not met the high burden of showing that legitimate
state objectives could not be accomplished by less discriminatory means. If the legitimate
goal was to prevent in-state harms from too much landfilling, the state could slow the
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Much of the Fort Gratiot case accordingly dealt with Michigan's
contrived attempts to argue that a statute which allows discrimination on
its face actually does not discriminate.' Michigan offered two argu-
ments that its statute operated evenhandedly, both of which the Court
satisfactorily refuted. First, Michigan contended that because some
counties did allow for disposal of out-of-state waste, on balance there was
no state discrimination against out-of-state waste. The Court correctly
countered that the amount of discrimination is irrelevant to the issue of
whether there is discrimination.' If any county could choose to reject
all out-of-state waste, then the statute was discriminatory regardless of
how many counties actually implemented this power.'
Second, the Court similarly rejected Michigan's argument that real
burdens felt by other Michiganders constituted proof that the statute
operated in a non-discriminatory fashion. Michigan emphasized that the
statute "discriminated" evenhandedly against both in-state and out-of-state
interests, while being a statewide enacted measure.9 Those burdened by
the statute had a democratic voice in its passage and could be presumed
to represent interests similar to the out-of-state interests burdened by the
enactment. The Court has sometimes emphasized that such virtual
representation can be key to determining whether a statute is motivated
by impermissible economic protectionism or permissible local purpose.'
flow of all waste rather than prohibit only flow from out of the area. Fort Grat'ot, 112
S. Ct. at 2027. The Court also rejected Michigan's contentions that the statutory incentives
to create landfills gave the private landfill space thus created the indicia of goods publicly
produced. Id. at 2026-27 & n.7. Finally, the Court summarily rejected Michigan's
contentions that the only (as opposed to merely the best) way to encourage counties to
manage their own waste was to give them exclusion powers. See id. at 2027-28
(contrasting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986), as a situation where local
purposes could not be accomplished by any other means than a ban on baitfish). The
lesson of the Court's analysis under the heightened scrutiny test is clear - the state
regulator should try to avoid having to justify his or her actions under that test at all
costs.
"' The lower courts in the Fort Gratiot litigation had accepted these contrived
arguments, presumably as an indirect way of cutting back on the Philadelphia rationale.
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2021. C. id. at 2022-23 (describing the lower courts'
judgments solely in terms of their treatment of the evenhandedness test).
89 Id. at 2024-25. Michigan's arguments on amount of discrimination make sense only
if the Court employs a balancing test. Since the Court's initial inquiry, however, is
whether there is facial discrimination, arguments about relative amounts of discrimination
(i.e., burdens on commerce) are irrelevant.
"Id. at 2024.
91 Id.
' See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675 (1981)
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The problems with this argument, however, are two-fold. First, as the
Court correctly noted, discrimination at a local level can easily amount
to discrimination by the state as a whole, albeit masked through smaller
subunits.93 If the real effect of the local ban is to protect in-state
economic interests at the expense of out-of-state competitors, each county
is not really discriminating against other counties, but all counties are
discriminating against other states by establishing local fiefdoms. The
second problem thus becomes the difficulty in establishing standards by
which the judiciary can determine whether such impermissible discrimina-
tion is occurring.
The Fort Gratiot Court evidently saw no need for such a factual
inquiry, failing even to respond to Chief Justice Rehnquist's related points
regarding in-state harms94 and arguing that there was no need to remand
for additional factual findings.95 Apparently the Fort Gratiot Court felt
no need to determine the amount of in-state versus out-of-state burden so
long as the statute blatantly allowed for some out-of-state burden. Virtual
representation seemingly only buttresses a state's claims under the Pike
evenhanded test but cannot help make the case as to which test -
heightened scrutiny or evenhanded - should apply.96 By treating waste
differently because of origin, Michigan foreclosed any opportunity to
claim the advantages of virtual representation.
(stating that "a state's own political processes will serve as a check against unduly
burdensome regulations"); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-73
n.17 (1981) (stating that "[tihe existence of major in-state interests adversely affected by
the Act is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse"); South Carolina State Highway
Dep'tv. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2 (1938) (stating that "legislative
action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted
on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state").
93Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024-25 (citing Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-
83 (1891) (holding a statute can violate the Commerce Clause even when it burdens in-
state as well as out-of-state producers), and Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(1951) (holding it unpersuasive to a determination of constitutionality that a statute
affected in-state milk producers as well as out-of-state producers)).
"See id. at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also William C. Waller, The
Dormant Commerce Clause and Interstate Shipment of Waste: Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natl. Res., 16 HAXv. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 294, 299-300
(1992) (pointing out the Fort Gratiot majority's failure to respond to the arguments
proffered by the Chief Justice in his dissent).
95 Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027 & n.8.
"This is a potentially significant modification or clarification regarding the virtual
representation doctrine. In the more recent cases of West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
114 S. Ct. 2205, 2209 (1994), and C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682 (1994), the
Court continues to discuss and reject virtual representation arguments when determining
which test to apply.
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Fort Gratiot accepted and followed Philadelphia's economic
protectionism analysis - that preserving in-state landfills for in-state use
is economic protectionism regardless of externalized costs. The case more
importantly demonstrated, by its treatment of Michigan's legitimate
purpose arguments, that the level of scrutiny applied determines whether
state arguments for regulation will be given serious consideration or short
shrift. Fort Gratiot reemphasized the Philadelphia message that when the
state discriminates based on origin, heightened Commerce Clause scrutiny
will doom the regulation. Fort Gratiot accordingly rejected arguments
that discrimination by a local unit is different from discrimination by the
state as a whole or that the comprehensiveness of state waste regulations,
including their burdens imposed on insiders, can overcome discrimination
against outsiders.
The Court in Fort Gratiot, however, also left open the same options
as did the Court in Philadelphia. The Court characterized the Fort Gratiot
case as raising a "rather narrow issue." The Fort Gratiot case, like
Philadelphia, only involved an outright ban imposed on private landfills
accepting municipal solid waste. The sole difference between the cases,
in the Court's mind, was the size of the governmental unit doing the
banning. 8 The Fort Gratiot Court also explicitly emphasized that issues
of hazardous waste and market exemption were not before it; presum-
ably all methods of regulation discussed in connection with the Philadel-
phia case also were not foreclosed by Fort Gratiot.1® The main
message of the Fort Gratiot case, like the ChemWaste case next to be
discussed,01 was reaffirmation of Philadelphia, not foreclosure of
qualitatively different methods of regulation.
97 Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023. The "narrow issue" on which the Court
focused was whether discrimination at a county level against outside waste (including
both in-state and out-of-state waste) constitutes the same kind of presumptively invalid
discrimination which was held unconstitutional in Philadelphia. In other words, the
Court's focus was upon whether the Michigan statute fairly could be categorized as
evenhanded. Id. at 2024.
"Id. at 2024-26.
9 Id. at 2023.
'- The Fort Gratiot Court noted later in its opinion that a state was not foreclosed
from arguing that even discriminatory regulation could be upheld under the dormant
Commerce Clause when the reason for the discrimination was the difference in danger
presented by the outside waste. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027 (stating that the
"conclusion would be different if the imported waste raised health or other concerns not
presented by Michigan waste"). But see inra note 130 (discussing the limited possibilities
for using this potential avenue of regulation).
"' See infra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
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C. ChemWaste Emphasized that Philadelphia Meant What It
Said About Quarantines
The ChemWaste case involved one prong of Alabama's attack against
out-of-state hazardous waste.02 Chemical Waste Management's privately
owned and operated Emelle, Alabama, facility is by far the largest commer-
cial hazardous waste landfill in the United States. 03 Although the RCRA
encourages states to site facilities within their borders as a way of guarantee-
ing twenty-year capacity for hazardous waste disposal,' local opposition
to the siting of hazardous waste disposal facilities is particularly strong, and
most states have no sizeable commercial hazardous waste disposal facili-
ties."05 As a result, great demand exists for the Emelle facility to receive
out-of-state waste in substantial volume, and, in line with this Article's earlier
arguments regarding externality,"'6 correspondingly strong resistance exists
to taking on this burden created by outsiders. The Emelle fact situation quite
literally represents one state being dumped on by others.
In response, Alabama enacted several regulatory measures, 7 only one
of which was before the Court in ChemWaste. The measure at issue in
'02 112 S. Ct. 2009. For discussion of the several pronged attack, see infra note 107.
'o3 ChemWaste, 112 S. Ct. at 2011; see also National Solid Waste Management Ass'n
v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F. Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Ala), rev'd, 910
F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990).
'o' 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K (1988).
lo ChemWaste, 112 S. Ct. at 2011. For more background to the problems of siting
hazardous waste facilities see William L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not in My Back Yard"
Syndrome: An Approach to Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to the
Siting of PCB Disposal Facilities, 63 N.C. L. REv. 811 (1985); Clifford S. Russell,
Economic Incentives in the Management of Hazardous Wastes, 13 COLUX J. EwVrL. L.
257 (1988); Jonathan R. Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding State
Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1 (1990); Susan A. Bretzke,
Note, Hazardous Waste in Interstate Commerce: Minimizing the Problem ater City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 77 (1989); Kenneth G. Cole, Comment,
Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc.: Alabama Attempts to Spread the Nation's
Hazardous Waste Disposal Burden by Imposing a Higher Tax on Out-of-State Hazardous
Waste, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1215 (1992); Robert 0. Jenkins, Note, Constitutionally
Mandated Southern Hospitality: National Solid Waste Management Association and
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Environmental Mgt., 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1001 (1991).
'06 See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
"o Alabama first tried, via the "Holley Bill," 1975 Ala. Acts 89-788, to reciprocally
ban hazardous waste from states which either had not entered into agreements with
Alabama or had refused to site disposal facilities in their own borders. See National Solid




ChemWaste was a fee of seventy-two dollars per ton imposed only on
hazardous waste generated outside Alabama ' s The Chem Waste Court
declared the fee unconstitutional, rejecting Alabama's argument that no less
discriminatory alternatives could prevent legitimate health hanrs and rejecting
Alabama more basic argument that it had a right to exclude health harms
caused only by others'wastes."°
Since the fee in Chem Waste was imposed only on out-of-state waste, the
facial discrimination and heightened scrutiny aspects of Philadelphia were
triggered.110 Although Fort Gratiot had emphasized that it did not address
hazardous waste issues, the presence of toxic waste in ChemWaste made no
difference to the Court's analysis. In other words, although some courts
occasionally still mistakenly equate non-hazardous with non-harmful, the
Chem Waste Court correctly implied that both forms of waste have negative
value and thus are harmful.' In the same way that the Fort Gratiot Court
made clear that Philadelphia meant what it said about states not being able
to reserve in-state private landfill space for its own citizens' use even when
that might be the most prudent way to encourage waste planning and facility
siting, the ruling in ChemWaste reaffirmed that the Court meant what it said
in Philadelphia about permitting harmful items to flow in interstate com-
merce, even when they are obviously and particularly harmfl.'
12
Accordingly, all arguments about the particular hazards of "hazardous"
waste were dealt with in Chem Waste as they were in Philadelphia, by
After the Holley Bill was declared imconstitutional, id. at 800, Alabama passed the
legislation partially addressed in ChemWaste. Other provisions of the legislation not
before the Court included a base fee imposed on all hazardous waste disposed of at
Emelle and a cap on annual volumes of waste which could be disposed of at Emelle. See
ChemWaste, 112 S. CL at 2012. Besides legislative efforts, Alabama unsuccessfully tried
to deter receipt of waste at Emelle by opposing particular clean-up projects which
designated Emelle as the final repository for disposal of contaminants. See Alabama v.
EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1560 (11th Cir. 1989) (reversing the grant of an injunction that
halted the shipment of toxic waste from Texas to Alabama).
1C ChemWaste, 112 S. Ct. at 2012.
109 Id. at 2014-15.
110 Id. at 2013. But see injra note 125 (arguing that heightened scrutiny should not
necessarily be triggered by compensatory fees).
11 ChemWaste, 112 S. Ct. at 2012 n.3. Philadelphia may not have emphasized the
harm of the waste involved, but it was clearly presented to the Court and noted by the
dissent in that case. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 630 (Rebnquist, J., dissenting) (noting
health dangers from leachate).
' Cf. Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, 584 So. 2d 1367, 1387 (Ala. 1991)
(expressing doubt that hazardous waste is an article of commerce); id. at 1390-91




construing the quarantine exception narrowly to require destruction near
the point of generation and/or total prohibition of trade in the item.'
Unless hazardous waste from outside the state was more harmful than that
generated inside the state, it could not be treated differently.'1 4 Since
Alabama's own hazardous waste was allowed to go to Emelle without the
fee, out-of-state waste must also be permitted to do so." 5
The ChemWaste Court thus confirmed Philadelphia's message that the
only permissible way to deal with externalities is to limit them across the
board. It is impermissible to limit externalities on the basis of who
created them. In other words, when Alabama argued that the real
problems of the Emelle facility were caused by the volume of hazardous
waste disposed of at the facility, the Court said the functional equivalent
of: If your real concern is danger to your residents, then limit vol-
ume."6 When Alabama said that it nevertheless wanted to responsibly
manage the hazardous waste generated by its own citizens and that this
could best be done by charging fees which allowed in-state disposal of
in-state waste but discouraged in-state disposal of out-of-state waste, the
Court said the functional equivalent of: If you really want to take on the
burdens of your waste producers, then do so, but do not burden private
operators with burdens that you have failed fully to take on."7
Thus, possibilities for waste regulation most clearly left open by the
ChemWaste Court are evenhanded but burdensome regulation and market
participant exemption. The Court specifically mentioned four examples
of evenhanded regulation available to Alabama which presumably would
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause: a per-ton fee on all waste, a
per-mile tax on all vehicles carrying hazardous waste through Alabama,
a cap on tonnage landfdlled at the Emelle site, and increased monitoring
and regulation of the transportation and disposal of hazardous waste
within Alabama's borders."' In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
"I ChemWaste, 112 S. Ct. at 2016 n.11.
"4 Id. at 2015.
"'Id. at 2016.
"6 Id. at 2015; see also Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626 (stating that New Jersey may
pursue the legitimate goal of reducing landfill harms "by slowing the flow of all waste
into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be
affected").
17 See ChemWaste, 112 S. Ct. at 2015 n.8 (discussing the state's arguments and the
Court's rejection of those arguments); see also supra note 13.
"' Chem Waste, 112 S. Ct. at 2015-16. Because these examples seemed to be listed
illustratively rather than exhaustively,, the Court thus apparently left open the entire field
of evenhanded regulation and by implication showed that it had not yet been faced in the
waste context with a case where evenhanded regulation was being challenged.
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specifically mentioned market participant type activities, such as subsidies
to Alabama waste producers or state ownership of disposal facilities, as
also not being foreclosed by the ChemWaste ruling." 9 This statement
was uncontradicted by the majority. Additionally, ChemWaste involved
a differential fee situation, and the Court did not directly address any
compensatory fee issues.12 In sum, the possibilities left open by
Philadelphia remained open after ChemWaste.
D. Oregon DEQ Foreclosed Using Compensatory Fees As an Easy
Solution to Externalized Out-of-State Waste Harms
As noted, the ChemWaste case, which involved a differential fee
charged to out-of-state waste, did not directly address what type of
compensatory waste fees might pass constitutional muster.' The
Oregon DEQ case provided some negative answers. In ruling that
compensatory fees cannot constitutionally offset general revenue
expenditures, the Oregon DEQ Court indicated that few compensatory
waste fees which a state might politically desire to pass will survive
dormant Commerce Clause attack.'
1. Background Regarding Compensatory Fees
A compensatory fee, or user fee," compensates the government for
expenses the government incurs relating to the non-citizen's activities. If
"9 Id. at 2019 (Rebnquist, C.L, dissenting).
0 The Court noted: "The State presents no argument here, as it did below, that the
additional fee makes out-of-state generators pay their 'fair share' of the costs of Alabama
waste disposal facilities, or that the additional fee is justified as a 'compensatory tax.'
Id. at 2016 n.9. The trial court had found this fee not to be compensatory, but it had not
foreclosed the possibility of compensatory fees. Id.
121 See supra note 120.
'2 Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1351-53. Together with the C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct.
1677 (discussed infra notes 164-222 and accompanying text) and West Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994) (discussed to a very limited extent infra notes 155-
63 and accompanying text), the Oregon DEQ case may indicate a significant shift in the
way the Court will decide future dormant Commerce Clause cases. A detailed analysis
and critique of the implications of this shift for the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence outside the waste context is beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note
6.
" The Court apparently lumps together compensatory fees and tax apportionment
situations, judging both by the test set out in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274,(1977). Although the issues are related, the purposes served by a compensatory
1994-95]
580 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 83
the state has charged its own citizens to provide a service or government
benefit, the outsider who uses the service may sometimes be charged a
fee, and such an arrangement will not necessarily violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. The justification for such a fee withstanding Com-
merce Clause scrutiny is that "interstate commerce may constitutionally
be made to pay its own way."'24 Significantly, heightened scrutiny
should not be triggered just because the fee is charged only to outsid-
ers."z Accordingly, compensatory fees potentially provide states which
fee versus a straight revenue measure are different. The compensatory fee reimburses the
state for something the state has provided and for which its citizens have already paid;
outsiders should therefore not be able to use what the state has provided without paying
their fair share. A general revenue tax assessed outsiders, on the other hand, asserts that
the outsider is really not such an outsider as she claims and that her connection to the
state, i.e., her business activity in the state, makes her an insider for purposes of the tax
charged; thus, it is fair to have her proportionally share the general revenue obligations
imposed on other citizens. The compensatory fee theoretically could require a more direct
nexus between the activity and the fee charged than the apportioned tax. The Court has
not seen fit, however, to distinguish between the two situations for assessing constitution-
ality under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Oregon DEQ opinion, on the other hand, drew theoretical distinctions between
compensatory fees and user fees. The Oregon DEQ Court defined the latter fees as
"charges imposed by the State for the use of state-owned or state-provided transportation
or other facilities and services." Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1352 n.6 (quoting
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis added). The type of compensatory fee at issue in the Oregon
DEQ litigation, contrary to the Court's analysis, would fit the Court's definition of a user
fee. The fee being charged out-of-state waste under the Oregon statute was designed to
compensate the state of Oregon for the use of its services (in the form of department of
environmental quality personnel) and for degradation of its resources (in the form of
externalities which the state would have to pay out of its own pocket). Id. at 1357
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The fee was being charged primarily not to equalize private
citizen tax burdens, but to recover costs. Because the Oregon DEQ Court labelled the fee
before it a compensatory fee rather than a user fee, id. at 1351, apparently limiting the
label "user fee" to the more narrow situation of literal government ownership, this Article
also uses the term "compensatory fee" to refer to situations where a state tries to recover
expenses for itself, as well as to situations where the state attempts to equalize tax
burdens placed on its private citizens.
'= Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981).
'z Id. (stating that "a state tax is not per se invalid because it burdens interstate
commerce since interstate commerce may constitutionally be made to pay its way"). Since
the purpose of such a fee is always to make the outsider bear a portion of the cost already
paid by insiders, if heightened scrutiny were applied against such fees, they would almost
never be collected. Although one could argue theoretically that the state has no less
discriminatory alternative to the compensatory fee for accomplishing the sharing of
burden and revenue, such an argument stretches heightened scrutiny out of shape, since
in fact the Court's nexus tests and presumptions in previous compensatory fee cases are
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want to manage their own trash a method of controlling the burdens of
out-of-state trash.
In reality, however, the allure of compensatory fees is not so bright
as might first appear. This is so not only because such fees cannot be
used as a pretext for excluding out-of-state waste, but more importantly
because even compensatory fees aimed only at recapturing the costs
imposed by out-of-state waste, under the Court's Philadelphia rationale,
cannot charge for all the waste burdens imposed by the out-of-state
waste."6 Additionally, as emphasized by the Oregon DEQ ruling, the
Court's current compensatory fee test requires a close match between the
event which triggers a fee against out-of-state interests and the in-state
costs being compensated." It was on this requirement of "substantial
equivalence" that the Oregon fee primarily founderedY8
more relaxed than heightened scrutiny demands in other situations. Nevertheless, Justice
Thomas, writing for the Court in Oregon DEQ, appeared to indicate that the Court in the
fuiture will view compensatory fees merely as variations on the heightened scrutiny test
and will uphold such fees only where they achieve a legitimate local purpose that cannot
be adequately served through nondiscriminatory means. Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1347.
1 The reason for this result is that the most important problems associated with
landfills are the externalities they impose. Under the Court's Philadelphia logic, these
externalities cannot be charged against out-of-state generators who use private landfills
unless the siting government which allowed the landfill to come into being has already
imposed or is currently imposing the same externalized costs upon its own citizens. See
supra notes 46-75 and accompanying text. For example, if a compensatory fee attempted
to charge out-of-state waste for the future clean-up costs associated with landfills, but the
state had not yet charged this cost against in-state waste generators or the current state
budget, the tax would be invalid under Philadelphia's implied "omit-externalities" logic.
Although the externalities of the landfill, in the form of future response costs, would be
very real and probably would require furture state expenditure of real dollars, the state, not
yet being out any actual funds, would not be permitted to charge others for what it had
not yet charged its own or itself.
' Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1352.
12 Id. The requirements for compensatory fees are set forth in Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). A fee withstands dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
when it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the
services provided by the State." Id. at 279. Since the disposal of garbage within the state
would always satisfy the substantial nexus requirement, the focus in garbage compensato-
ry fee cases is upon the other elements of the test. "Discrimination" in tax cases does not
mean that the fee is charged only to the out-of-staters, but rather that the out-of-state
interests are being singled out disproportionately to pay expenses not borne by in-staters.
Some older dormant Commerce Clause decisions indicated that the presumption was
in favor of the reasonableness of compensatory fees and the burden was upon those
challenging the fee to establish its disproportionality to services provided. See Clark v.
Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 599 (1939) ("The burden rested upon them to show that
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2. The Type of Fee Involved in Oregon DEQ
The fee Oregon charged out-of-state waste in the Oregon DEQ
litigation was presumed to exactly equal costs Oregon paid from its state
treasury relating to the same amount of in-state waste."z Oregon did
not argue that the need for a fee on out-of-state waste was because of
some unprovable peculiarity of the out-of-state waste,13 but it more
the fees were excessive for the declared purposes."); Great N. Ry. v. Washington, 300
U.S. 154, 160 (1937) ("A law exhibiting the intent to impose a compensatory fee for such
a legitimate purpose is prima facie reasonable."). More recent cases did not emphasize
presumptions in quite the same fashion, but until Oregon DEQ they clearly did not place
the burden on the state to justify its fee. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
453 U.S. 609, 611 (1981) (concluding that the challenger failed to demonstrate that the
Montana tax suffers from any of the constitutional defects alleged); Evansville-
Vandenburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc, 405 U.S. 707, 709 (1972)
(upholding a "use and service charge" at an airport). Oregon DEQ, however, seemed to
start with the view that compensatory fees are an evil to be avoided whenever possible
and that the state bears an extremely high burden when defending them. See infra notes
133-51 and accompanying text.
In determining whether the fee discriminates, the Court decides if the fee taxes
"substantially equivalent events" for which finds have been collected in-state and also
decides if the fee passes the Court's "internal consistency" test. See Annco, Inc. v.
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 643-44 (1984) (holding a tax unconstitutional upon a finding that
"manufacturing and wholesaling are not substantially equivalent events" and also
requiring that a tax not result in a situation where if every jurisdiction applied the same
tax, there would be undue burden on interstate commerce, i.e., violation of the "intemnal
consistency" test). Assuming this discrimination hurdle is cleared, the final inquiry in
compensatory fee cases is whether the fee reasonably relates to burdens imposed and/or
services provided. Although the fee involved in Oregon DEQ failed the substantial
equivalence hurdle, it arguably satisfied the other elements of the Complete Auto test. See
Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1352-53.
129 Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1353. Since the Oregon DEQ Court declared Oregon's
statute facially invalid, no set of circumstances could be hypothesized for the Oregon
statute that would fulfill dormant Commerce Clause criteria. Id. at 1355. Accordingly, the
most favorable set of circumstances to establish the constitutionality of the statute - a fee
which only compensated Oregon for the costs imposed by out-of-state waste and for
which identical costs had been collected relative to in-state trash - was hypothesized. Id.
at 1350, 1353.
1o Trying to prove differences in out-of-state waste as justification for fees levied
only against out-of-state waste is almost always an impossibility. Since such attempted
justifications are always subjected to heightened scrutiny, the state is put in a "Catch-22"
situation. To justify a fee based on difference, the state must demonstrate difference.
Usually, however, the method used to demonstrate difference can itself be argued to be
a less discriminatory method that would defeat the across-the-board fee. For example, a
fee based on alleged hazardous constituents present only in out-of-state waste would
usually be demonstrated by inspection of the waste, which itself might become a less
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modestly contended that out-of-state waste had not yet paid the same
dollar amounts as were being paid in relation to in-state waste. 3' The
question Oregon DEQ posited was whether a fee that recovered no more
than the same costs actually being collected and expended in relation to
in-state waste would nevertheless violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Oregon DEQ Court declared such an equalizing fee unconstitution-
aL
132
3. The Oregon DEQ Opinion - Presumptions
Against Compensatory Fees and Insistence on
Substantial Equivalence Doom Oregon's Statute
The Oregon DEQ Court evaluated compensatory fees with a
presumption against their validity. 33 This departure from prior Com-
merce Clause case law"3 bodes ill for the future of compensatory fees
generally and waste fees particularly. The Oregon Supreme Court, for
example, had read prior case law to indicate that a more lenient test
should be applied to compensatory fees than that employed under
heightened scrutiny.135 Instead, the majority opinion of the U.S. Su-
preme Court placed compensatory fees squarely under the virtual per se
rule of invalidity.13
discriminatory method of excluding or charging against only that waste which really
contains the hazardous constituents. Nevertheless, the Court in Oregon DEQ, as in
previous waste cases, continued to offer this false bait to regulators. Id. at 1351 & n.5.
'3 Id. at 1348.
112 Id. at 1355.
13 Id. at 1352 ("Though our cases sometimes discuss the concept of the compensatory
tax as if it were a doctrine unto itself, it is merely a specific way of justifying a facially
discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through
nondiscriminatory means.").
'3 See also supra notes 122, 123, 125, 128 and accompanying text.
"' See Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1349.
m The Court stated.
[E]ven if the surcharge merely recoups the costs of disposing of out-of-state
waste in Oregon, the fact remains that the differential charge favors shippers
of Oregon waste over their counterparts handling waste generated in other
States. In making that geographic distinction, the surcharge patently discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce.
Because the Oregon surcharge is discriminatory, the virtually per se rule of
invalidity provides the proper legal standard here, not the Pike balancing test.
Id. at 1350.
As previous discussions of the Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot cases indicate, the level
of scrutiny applied to a waste regulation is near determinative of its validity. Justice
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By placing Oregon's compensatory fee under the strict scrutiny test,
Justice Thomas virtually ensured that it would be found unconstitutional.
Thus, Oregon DEQ becomes another example of how the Court's choice
of a Commerce Clause test determines the results in waste cases. By
emphasizing that Oregon charged in-state and out-of-state waste different
amounts at the same site, then defining such difference as per se
discrimination, and then requiring that such per se discrimination be
justified under strictest scrutiny,'37 the Oregon DEQ Court made its
self-fulfilling prophecy of presumption against validity come to pass.
When heightened scrutiny is employed, existence of a less discriminatory
alternative will almost always prove the unconstitutionality of the
regulation. In the case of Oregon's fee, *taxing in-state and out-of-state
waste the same amount at the landfill gate could always be viewed as a
less discriminatory alternative. Justice Thomas emphasized the same point
through the term "substantial equivalence."'"
By strictly construing "substantial equivalence" to mean almost
exactly the same event, Justice Thomas jdoomed Oregon's statutory
scheme. Oregon argued that the state satisfied the dormant Commerce
Clause when it fully collected waste fees related to in-state waste, via a
combination of general revenues and taxes and that it did not have the
similar ability to tax out-of-state generators or spread costs across the
entire out-of-state population."9 The Oregon DEQ Court rejected these
arguments, focusing solely on the difference in the fee charged to the
waste rather than upon whether Oregon had power to tax all waste
streams in a similar fashion.4' From Oregon's perspective, it was a
legitimate policy to spread waste disposal costs throughout the state in
various ways for in-state waste."' However, it was impossible for
Thomas emphasized this trtuh "As a result, the surcharge must be invalidated unless
respondents can 'show that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives' .... The State's burden
of justification is so heavy that 'facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect."' Id.
at 1351 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
137 Id. at 1351.
13 Id. at 1352.
9 Id. at 1353.
140 Id.
141 Id. Each state legitimately may wish to subsidize some generators relative to
others by not charging them their truly proportional costs of waste generation, even if
those costs accurately could be determined. Nothing should be constitutionally infirm with
a state choosing, for example, not to charge its poor for the costs of waste disposal, or
choosing to give its in-state utilities a reduced rate for all aspects of business operations,
including waste disposal, by reducing their tax rate. Since all states subsidize their waste
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Oregon to collect and spread costs similarly for out-of state waste.
Oregon only had the power to tax out-of-state waste when that waste was
headed towards Oregon landfills.
The Court found Oregon's cost-spreading goals insufficient to
overcome the presumption of invalidity.142 The Court articulated its
objection by using the deceptively objective-sounding language of a
failure to tax a substantially similar event 43 as if Oregon could accom-
plish its cost-spreading/full recovery goals by substituting a different tax
for the fee it had chosen. But in reality, Oregon's cost-spreading goals
were inherently incompatible with the kind of substantially similar taxing
event the Court required. Only a discrete tax on particular in-state waste
would have satisfied the Court, e.g., a per-ton fee on both in-state and
out-of-state waste.'" A per-ton tax on in-state waste, however, would
be exactly the opposite of cost-spreading.
As in the Fort Gratiot and ChemWaste cases, the arguments of the
state and the concerns of the Court were at cross purposes. From the
Court's perspective, so long as Oregon's scheme always produced
differential direct taxation on similar items, a legitimate purpose could
never exist. 45  From Oregon's perspective, so long as Oregon had
producers to varying degrees, a fee charged against waste, whether in-state or out-of-state,
never exactly matches hanms with generators. In other words, regardless of what fee is
actually charged to waste, there will always be those who get a relatively free ride for the
real costs associated with their waste being disposed in Oregon landfills.
The key constitutional question should have been whether taxing in different
manners - by general revenues versus waste fees - appears to invite favoritism to in-state
enterprises over out-of-state enterprises engaged inthe same type of business. The Oregon
DEQ Court never satisfactorily identified what in-state interests were advantaged by
Oregon's fee or what out-of-state interests were disadvantaged. The Court presumed either
that those who hauled waste requiring no differential tipping fee were primarily Oregon
businesses, or that most waste which was not charged the fee got more of a free ride than
out-of-state waste. Since under heightened scrutiny the burden became Oregon's to refute
these assumptions, the possibility of such favoritism was enough to defeat the legislation,
despite the lack of real evidence on either side to indicate any in-state haulers or
generators actually being given favorable treatment.
142 Id. at 1353-54.
143 Id. at 1353.
14 The Court identified the one-to-one correspondence of item to tax involved in use
tax situations as the "prototypical example of substantially equivalent taxable events" and
indicated its "reluctance to recognize new categories of compensatory taxes." Id.
14' The Court comes close to frankly acknowledging this effect of its ruling, stating
that "because respondents have offered no legitimate reason to subject waste generated
in other States to a discriminatory surcharge ... the surcharge is facially invalid. ...




already collected fully for in-state waste, any out-of-state waste not being
assessed a fully compensatory fee was getting a free ride into Oregon
landfills.' When Oregon emphasized that it had already fully collected
and paid costs regarding in-state waste, the Court used this information
to reinforce its argument that in-state waste, unlike out-of-state waste, was
being subsidized. 47 When Oregon emphasized that out-of-state waste
had not yet paid for its full share of harms and therefore should be
deterred, the Court used this information to buttress its argument that
Oregon was impermissibly hoarding landfill space for insiders.'"
Focused solely upon the effect of Oregon's fee upon waste at the gate, the
Court told Oregon that it could not have it both ways - either Oregon
could continue to spread costs away from the gate for in-state waste
(meaning it would also effectively have to absorb such costs for out-of-
state waste),'49 or it could charge both types of waste full fees at the
gate (meaning under Oregon's current taxing scheme that Oregonians
would have to pay twice for the same services for in-state disposal of in-
state generated waste). 5 Oregon's goal of cost spreading was incompat-
ible with the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause.'51
4. Subsidies and Fees that Might Survive Oregon DEQ
Oregon DEQ spoke to the issue of compensatory waste fees in the
same way that Philadelphia spoke more generally to the issue of waste
and the dormant Commerce Clause. In both cases, states invited the Court
to take a more lenient Commerce Clause view in waste management
situations, arguing that in such situations the state is under an obligation
to care for trash generated within its borders and is therefore motivated
primarily by environmental rather than economic protectionistic concerns.
In both cases, the Court instead restrictively and mechanically interpreted
prior Commerce Clause case law to prohibit state action that would
negatively affect private waste operators. Just as Philadelphia foreclosed
favoring in-state created externalities when disposing of waste, Oregon
146 Id. at 1359 (Rehnquist, C.L, dissenting) (noting that Oregon "is only asking that
those neighbors pay their fair share of the use of Oregon landfill sites").
147 Id. at 1353-54.
141 Id. at 1354.
1
49 The Oregon legislature anticipated the contingency that its out-of-state differential
would be found unconstitutional and directed that in such circumstance the out-of-state
fee be reduced to that charged in-state. See id. at 1348 & n.2.
1SO Id. at 1352.
"' Id. at 1351.
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DEQ restrictively read prior compensatory fee case law to completely
foreclose alternative funding sources for burdens imposed by different
waste sources." After Oregon DEQ, a state which wants to recover
any of the costs imposed by waste buried at landfills in the state must do
so by charging the same amount against all waste of the same type
brought to the state's landfills.
Oregon DEQ, however, does not foreclose other methods by which
a state may cut waste costs for its own citizens relative to out-of-staters.
Discriminatory fees charged by a market participant and subsidies
aimed to benefit only in-state interests are two variations on compensato-
ry fees that presumably are not foreclosed by the Oregon DEQ ruling. It
should be noted that the Oregon DEQ Court's specific emphasis on the
fact that it was not dealing with fees charged by a state-owned facility or
fees charged due to use of state resources" by implication left open
market exemption possibilities for approval.
Subsidies in connection with fees charged to out-of-state waste,
however, are a more complicated matter. Presumably, subsidies enacted
as part of a waste program which also includes compensatory fees are not
foreclosed by Oregon DEQ 55 A state which collected fifty dollars per
" The Court viewed any loosening of the substantially similar event requirement as
a Pandora's box, declining "to open such an expansive loophole in our carefully confined
compensatory tax jurisprudence," and it viewed any invitation to weigh comparative
burdens of taxes that were not near carbon copies of each other as a "plunge into the
morass" foreclosed by a previous decision. Id. at 1353 & n.8 (quoting American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 289 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
As Justice Thomas conceded, this antipathy to compensatory fees is a "recent reluctance
to recognize new categories of compensatory taxes." Id. at 1353 (emphasis added).
However, the Court used the Oregon DEQ facts to reaffirm that the direction of decisions
begun in Arnco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984), and continued by cases such as
Scheiner was so far developed as to be considered well-settled, irreversible, and inflexible.
A more detailed consideration of the implications of the Oregon DEQ ruling on dormant
Commerce Clause or compensatory fee jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article
but will hopefully be addressed in a planned future work. See supra note 6.
1 See also infra notes 281-88 and accompanying text (exploring possibilities for
market participant exemption).
5 Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1352 n.6.
.. Attorneys crafting any subsidy measures should, however, be aware of the
following potentially troublesome language in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114
S. Ct. 2205, 2214 n.15 (1994): "We have never squarely confronted the constitutionality
of subsidies, and we need not do so now." The West Lynn Creamery Court admitted that
the Court generally has considered subsidies not to violate the Commerce Clause but
apparently did not wish to give an absolute green light to subsidies. See id.
In West Lynn Creamery, the Court declared unconstitutional a state milk pricing
order which collected fees from all milk sold or processed in Massachusetts but then used
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ton for all waste disposed in the state could, at the same time, use funds
from its general revenues to help some or all in-state waste generators to
pay their waste disposal costs. This scenario would effectively give in-
staters a competitive advantage over out-of-staters who were not similarly
subsidized. For example, if a state provides "free" garbage pickup service
for its citizens, 56 the total cost of disposal is obviously lower for waste
picked up "on the state" than if the entities that generated the waste had
to pay for its collection as well. Indirect unlinked "subsidies" of this sort
presumably would not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Every state
can provide such subsidies in whatever effective amount it wishes to
enable garbage generated in that state to compete with garbage from other
states.
Given the Court's recent reasoning in West Lynn Creamery,"
however, it would likely be unconstitutional for a state to directly link the
amount of any given in-state subsidy to amounts charged all waste as
tipping fees.' For example, if the state charged fifty dollars per ton for
all waste disposed at in-state landfills but then rebated ten dollars to
haulers for every ton of in-state waste they deposited at in-state landfills,
this situation would be viewed by the Court as no different from
impermissibly charging a lower forty dollar per-ton fee at the front end
based on waste origin.'59 A ten dollar per-ton subsidy given to in-state
that fund to subsidize only Massachusetts dairy farmers. Id. at 2212. The state argued that
the fund was like general revenues which a state was entitled to use to benefit only its
own. Id. at 2214. The Court emphasized that the linked nature of this fird meant that it
was taking primarily from outsiders to benefit solely insiders. Id. at 2214-16. In fact, the
amount of the fee which Massachusetts charged seemed to be tied to the amount of out-
of-state milk which was expected to be sold or processed in Massachusetts, see id. at
2210 n.5, thus reinforcing the Court's intuition that the state collected this fee primarily
against outsiders and at the expense of an out-of-state industry which was in competition
with in-state beneficiaries of the fee, see id. at 2212. Detailed consideration of the West
Lynn Creamery case is beyond the scope of this Article.
" Of course such pickup is not truly free, since it is funded through state revenues
to which the generators have at least partly contributed. There is, however, no guarantee
that the actual value of the pickup for any individual generator (if assessed on the open
market) approximates that generator's contribution to the source of funding for the pickup.
Also, RCRA does not obligate the state to provide pickup for all generators' trash, so
whatever the state provides, relative to other states, assists or disadvantages generators in
that state relative to the overall waste disposal services market.
" See supra note 155 for a brief description of the West Lynn facts and holding.
.. West Lynn Creamey, 114 S. Ct. at 2212.
15 The author emphasizes that, just as he does not think that the Court should have
declared the differential fee in Oregon DEQ unconstitutional, he also believes its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is misguided to declare any linked subsidy per se
unconstitutional - at least so long as the fee charged against out-of-state waste does no
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generators of waste, on the other hand, to assist in their disposal costs,
might withstand dormant Commerce Clause attack. The haulers who
picked up such subsidized trash would not be expected to reduce their fee
to handle the subsidized trash, and the haulers still would be paying the
full fee the state charged at the landfill gate for both subsidized and
unsubsidized trash.
West Lynn Creamery probably also forecloses the imposition of a
revenue-raising fee on all waste to benefit only in-state interests affected
by the fee. To stick with the last example, if the state charges fifty dollars
per ton to all waste regardless of origin but then subsidizes in-state
generators ten dollars per ton out of this fifty-dollar fee, the Court would
likely view this scheme as impermissibly taking from outsiders to benefit
insiders of the same type. The assumption would be that a substantial
portion of the fifty dollars charged to haulers is passed on from haulers
to generators in the form of higher hauling fees; generators would
therefore be paying a substantial portion of the fifty-dollar tipping fee. If
portions of this fee were earmarked to go back to in-state generators, out-
of-state generators in effect would be paying in-state generators a
substantial part of the subsidy even when both of them disposed at the
same site and produced identical harms. Such discrimination against out-
of-state commerce to fund in-state benefits would violate the dormant
Commerce Clause."s
To avoid this "linkage" problem, a state wishing to use a compensato-
ry waste fee should make sure that either: 1) any state subsidies are not
funded by fees directly linked to the industry the state wishes to
benefit;' 6' or 2) fees collected from out-of-state interests similar to
those the state wishes to benefit should go only to expenses the state has
actually incurred in regard to the out-of-state waste. 2 If these caution-
ary steps are not taken, the state runs the strong risk that its linked
subsidy will be declared unconstitutional.
more than compensate for costs imposed by that waste. Nevertheless, given the Court's
holdings in Oregon DEQ and West Lynn, it seems clear such a linked subsidy would be
declared unconstitutional by the current Court.
, Again, the author does not necessarily agree with this logic as a matter of proper
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence but instead believes only that the Court, given
its strong and unequivocal recent precedents in C&A Carbone, Oregon DEQ, and West
Lynn Creamery, would utilize such an approach.
' For example, the state could fund a waste generator subsidy through general
revenues rather than via a dedicated waste fee fund that collects indirectly from out-of-
state waste generators.
", For example, the state should leave no money from the fee collected against both
in-state and out-of-state waste to be used for anything else, such as subsidies.
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Overall, since even carefully crafted compensatory fees allow only
some waste burdens imposed by out-of-state waste to be recovered, such
fees may not allow enough recapture of the real burdens imposed by out-
of-state trash to provide meaningful relief to states burdened by others'
trash. To recover even these limited harms, compensatory fees must be
meticulously designed. The Oregon DEQ case rejected the invitation to
loosen prior compensatory fee case law requirements and thus prevented
states from easily recovering for out-of-state waste harms.16 A poten-
tially even more devastating blow to current state waste management
practice, however, came in the Court's second 1994 decision, C&A
Carbone.
E. C&A Carbone Foreclosed Mandatory Flow Control, but It Did
Not Prevent Publicly Assisted Flow Control
In C&A Carbone, the Court threw a significant wrench in state and
local waste planning efforts by broadly declaring flow control1f "
unconstitutional.65 In reaching further than it needed to make this
sweeping ruling,1" the Court left no doubt of its general antipathy to
state efforts which shortcut the cost of more evenhanded waste regulation.
Since many states have depended on some form of flow control as an
important part of their waste planning efforts, C&A Carbone has
significant impact on numerous existing state programs." For this
reason and because the case has not yet generated a significant body of
critical commentary,' it receives more attention in this Article than
13 Oregon DEQ, 114 S. Ct. at 1351-53.
16 "Flow control" refers to a state or local government's directives that the trash its
citizens generate go to specified waste processing and/or disposal facilities. Flow control
is more, therefore, than regulation of how trash may be handled, it is a claim that the
government exclusively may control trash, despite citizen or competitor assertions that
others might as safely and more economically take care of portions of the community's
trash management needs.
"'C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1682.
'"See injra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
'
67 In response to the C&A Carbone decision, several legislative initiatives have been
sponsored which would effectively overrule the decision, as least for some flow control
regimes. For example, during the final editing stages of this Article, hearings were
proceeding before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous
Materials on flow control proposals. This Article proceeds on the assumption that the
C&A Carbone decision will remain controlling precedent for state waste planning efforts.
" For two examples of critical analysis written prior to the C&A Carbone decision,
see Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Does Garbage Have Standing?: Democracy, Flow Control
and a Principled Constitutional Approach to Municipal Solid Waste Management, 11
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that allotted to pre-1994 Court precedents. After first setting the factual
and case law background for flow control, this section briefly analyzes
the C&A Carbone decision and then considers what forms of flow control
should still survive constitutional attack.
1. Background Regarding Flow Control
The government-offered justifications for flow control are a mixture
of health and safety concerns, political practicality, and economic
concerns. Since trash poses serious health and safety risks, government
legitimately may insist that generators not do whatever they wish with
trash they generate. As a practical matter, a system directing only how
individuals dispose of their trash can lead to serious enforcement
problems unless substantial funds are expended to ensure compliance. It
is easier to require everyone to use a facility or service that safely handles
trash to the government's satisfaction. Directing all waste generated in the
governing area to a single such approved facility constitutes flow control.
An additional reason for flow control is financial. Where the government
seeks to provide disposal services itself or enter into long-term contracts
for its citizens, a guaranteed base amount of trash may be necessary to
make trash management projects economically viable. The C&A Carbone
Court, however, found these health and safety and/or related financial
justifications unpersuasive against Commerce Clause attack.
In invalidating Clarkstown's particular ordinance, the Court did more
than strike down an experimental or innovative regulation. Unlike the
situation in any of the previous waste cases before the Court,69 flow
control is something most states have instituted in one form or anoth-
er '7 and have considered key to their internal waste management
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 157 (1993); Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid Waste Crisis: Flow Control
and the Commerce Clause, 39 S.D. L. REv. 529 (1994).
' In previous cases, state regulation methods at issue were ones which a number of
states might desire to copy if the technique were found to be constitutional, but which
most states had not yet implemented and which some probably would not implement even
if found to be constitutional.
170 Most states seem to have utilized flow control, despite Justice O'Connor's citation
to only 21 statutes that authorize flow control. C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1690
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's listing omitted explicit or assumed
municipal or county power to direct local trash which was not established as part of
comprehensive waste planning. She did not include, for example, the Kentucky statutes
discussed immediately following in the text. As two early Court precedents also indicate,
local ability to control waste via monopoly franchises has a long history. All such waste
collection monopolies would also be included as flow control and have thus been ruled
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strategies. Flow control arrangements are primarily implemented at the
local level but occasionally are set up to operate at a statewide level. In
Kentucky, for example, long before the legislature's Special Session on
solid waste, the Louisville area used home rule authorization to direct that
all trash generated in the city go to a municipal incinerator."' In the
1980s, section 109 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes assumed the validity
of flow control power when it authorized counties and waste management
districts to enter into contracts for the disposal of waste generated within
the county or waste management district." The 1991 Special Session
of the Kentucky legislature continued to assume such power in local
government when it turned this authorization into a command that all
counties provide their residents with access to collection services. 73
Although most states similarly put primary authority for flow control with
local authorities, some states, like New Jersey and Delaware, exercise
flow control at the statewide level through boards or authorities which
route all waste generated in the state. 74 As Justice O'Connor correctly
pointed out; Congress assumed, without explicitly authorizing its
implementation, that localities had the authority to enter into long-term
contracts for disposal of their citizens' trash and to direct locally
generated trash to specific locations.'75 In short, flow control is wide-
spread.
Until July of 1991, no court had found flow control unconstitutional
in response to challenges raised under due process, antitrust, or the
dormant Commerce Clause.(' The United States Supreme Court in two
1905 decisions, California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction
Works'" and Gardner v. Michigan,78 upheld ordinances which grant-
unconstitutional by C&A Carbone.
1 See 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gem 84 (1979).
172 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 109.041, .082 (Baldwin Supp. 1993).
173 See id. § 224A3-315 (Baldwin 1992). At the state level, Kentucky statutes also
have provided the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet (the
"Cabinet") with authority in emergency situations to direct waste collected in one waste
management district or county to be deposited at particular disposal facilities elsewhere
in the state. See id. § 224.10-105(3), (4).
" See Filiberto Sanitation v. New Jersey DEP, 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988); Harvey
& Harvey v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985). For a listing
of 22 state statutes which arguably authorize flow control, see Petitioner's Brief at 14 n.8,
C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
m See C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176 See DeVito v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775
(D.R.I.), aft'd, 947 F.2d 1004 (lst Cir. 1991).
177 199 U.S. 306, 310 (1905).
171 199 U.S. 325, 327 (1905).
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ed monopoly franchises to private contractors for collection of San Francisco
and Detroit garbage. In each case, competitors of the contractor who was
awarded the franchise were denied the right to markets they formerly had
serviced and were thereby put out of business. The Court found that the cities'
franchises did not violate due process, even though less burdensome
alternatives might have been available.!79 More recent lower court decisions
had uniformly upheld local garbage monopolies and flow control against
antitrust attack, emphasizing not only that a state action exception to antitrust
claims exists, but also that the challenged action, local garbage collection, is
a traditional governmental function and therefore subject to less intrusive
governmental scrutiny.8'
Prior to DeJito v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp.,
lower courts displayed uniformity in their rejection of challenges to flow
control under the dormant Commerce Clause." The cases upholding flow
control emphasized the legitimacy of the state action, the fact that the burden
of increased costs associated with flow control was placed upon the citizens
subject to the regulation rather than outsiders, and the fact that any effect on
interstate commerce was minimal and incidental.' The pendulum started
to swing the other way, however, with the 1991 DeVito decision.
17 See, e.g., id. at 333 ("If it be said that the city might have adequately guarded the
public health and at the same time saved the property rights of its owner on whose
premises garbage and refuse were found, the answer is that the city evidently thought
otherwise, and we cannot confidently say that its constituted authorities went beyond the
necessities of the case .... "). Given the time period of these decisions, in the height of
Lochner-type substantive due process analysis, this deference to the validity of local
police powers over supposed free market property interests is significant. See Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
"SO See, e.g., Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1195 (6th Cir.),
vacated, 455 U.S. 931 (1981); Seay Bros., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 601 F. Supp.
1518, 1520 (D.N.M. 1985). Although some of these cases lean upon National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled ly Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding state and local governments immune
from federal regulations based on the Commerce Clause when performing traditional
government functions), in support of their deference claim, the deference continues in
post-Garcia decisions. See, e.g., Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 803
F. Supp. 451, 453 (D. Me. 1992).
.. 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I.), aft'd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991).
' See, e.g., Filiberto Sanitation v. New Jersey DEP, 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988);
Hybud Equip., 654 F.2d at 1194-95; Harvey & Harvey v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth.,
600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985); cf C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 770
F. Supp. 848, 854 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (assuming constitutionality of the flow control of
garbage generated within township boundaries).
" See supra note 1; see also Town of Clarkstown v. C&A Carbone, Inc., 587
N.Y.S.2d 681 (1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
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In DeVito, a federal district court granted a preliminary injunction
against Rhode Island's enforcement of its flow control and tipping fee
regulations for commercial trash generated within Rhode Island.'"
Under Rhode Island statutes which mandated that the state-owned and
operated landfill exclusively handle Rhode Island trash needs, household
residential trash could be charged a tipping fee of no more than around
fourteen dollars per ton.185 To operate this facility without incurring
significant debt or requiring subsidies via general revenues, operating
costs would have to be recovered by continually raising the tipping fee
for commercial waste, even though both household and commercial waste
were being directed to the same disposal facility and arguably creating the
same amount of environmental harm.' At the time of suit, Rhode
Island was charging a tipping fee of forty-nine dollars per ton for
commercial waste."s DeVito, a Massachusetts waste hauling company,
could charge Rhode Island commercial facilities considerably less to have
their waste disposed of at facilities outside Rhode Island. Viewing Rhode
Island's restrictions on the disposal of commercial waste as unfair
economic protectionism, the DeVito court declared them unconstitutional
under the dormant Commerce Clause.1u
Subsequent courts expanded the DeVito logic to strike down flow
control efforts which did not charge different waste generators within the
community different fees for disposal.8 9 Courts that thus invalidated
flow control emphasized that the measuring stick for the burden on
commerce was the effect on out-of-state companies that otherwise would
receive the in-state trash, rather than the extent of the burden on in-state
residents. Those courts also emphasized that solutions provided by
interstate trash markets were necessary to solve national trash problems
and contended that heightened scrutiny should be applied to such
regulations. 9 ° The C&,4 Carbone Court resolved this split among the
lower courts by declaring flow control unconstitutional..9'
1" Detito, 770 F. Supp. at 777.
185 Id. at 777 n.2.
1"6 See id. at 777, 781.
187 Id.
18 Id.
189 See, e.g., Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 1385 (8th Cir.
1993); Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814 F. Supp.
1566, 1579 (M.D. Ala. 1993); cf SDDS Inc. v. South Dakota, 994 F.2d 486, 493 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1993); Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1277 n.8
(7th Cir. 1992); Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of Gray, 632 A.2d 134, 137 (Me. 1993).
190 See cases cited supra note 189.
591 C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1684.
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2. The Quirkiness of the C&A Carbone Facts
The C&A Carbone case involved flow control by the town of
Clarkstown, which required all trash discarded in the township to be sent
to a local transfer station."r Previously, the town dump had to be
closed because of environmental violations and inadequacies, and
Clarkstown had then entered into an agreement with a private contractor
for a lease and buy back of a transfer station to be constructed by the
private operator. To guarantee sufficient income to the contractor for
return on investment to build the new facility, Clarkstown entered into a
put or pay agreement193 with the contractor to provide a minimum
volume of trash to the facility at a set tipping fee. To guarantee that
enough trash would come to the facility to fulfill the put or pay agree-
ment, Carkstown enacted ordinances requiring that all trash discarded
within the township go to the transfer station and mandating that no
competing transfer stations could be constructed in Clarkstown 1
The facts thus far stated make the C&A Carbone situation roughly
analogous to other monopolistic flow control patterns for constructed
facilities." 5 The unique factual twists to the C&A Carbone litigation are
provided by the nature of the petitioner, C&A Carbone, Inc., who was an
alleged recycler of trash generated primarily from outside of Clarkstown.
Carbone's operations were opposed by the township when Carbone first
sought a permit to operate as recycler because the town feared that the
recycling operation was really a sham for Carbone to operate as an illegal
transfer station. Carbone, however, won this battle and received a permit
1
'
9 Id. at 1680.
19 Id. A put or pay agreement means that the generator (Clarstown) agrees to pay
at least a minimum amount of money to the operator, figured on a set tipping fee
multiplied by a set amount of trash. This total fee is paid whether or not the figured
amount of waste actually is provided to the facility. The generator typically is guaranteed
the tipping fee price for excess amounts of trash beyond the guaranteed minimum, but if
he does not "put" the minimurm amount with the facility he still must "pay" the minimum
fee as if he had disposed of that much trash. When Clarkstown negotiated its put or pay
arrangement with the constructor of the new transfer station, it figured minimum fees
based on the amount of waste its residents would generate without regard to operations
such as Carbone's.
' Id. at 1680-81.
1 See, e.g., Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993);
Filiberto Sanitation v. New Jersey DEP, 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988); Hybud Equip. Corp.
v. Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir.), vacated, 455 U.S. 931 (1981); Waste Recycling, Inc.
v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993);
Harvey & Harvey v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985); City
of Auburn v. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc., 632 A.2d 227 (Me. 1993).
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to operate as a recycler."9' The residue generated from Carbone's
recycling operations (the trash left after recyclables were removed),
however, fit the town's definition of trash discarded within the township
and thus under the ordinance was required to go to the town transfer
station. Carbone claimed this result interfered with his rights under the
dormant Commerce Clause to deal in interstate trash. Additionally, trash
from town residents was found by the township to be coming to
Carbone's facilities rather than to the town transfer station. Carbone, at
least in his original briefs to the Court, asserted that the right to receive
this town-generated trash for recycling at his facility was also protected
by the dormant Commerce Clause. 97
In his reply brief, however, Carbone shifted exclusively to the out-of-
state nature of his trash and largely dropped arguments about his alleged
entitlement to process locally generated trash."'8 Similarly, in parallel
federal district court litigation, where Carbone won a temporary injunc-
tion against the ordinance,'" the basis for the injunction was that
Carbone dealt primarily in trash which originated outside the township,
and the federal court injunction was limited to this out-of-state generated
trash (including residue left over after Carbone's "recycling" operations
were completed in Clarkstown). °° These atypical facts would have
permitted the Court to decide the case before it on fairly narrow
grounds.2"' The C&A Carbone Court instead chose to rule as broadly
against flow control as any waste industry proponent might have desired.
'- See Town of Clarkstown v. C&A Carbone, Inc., 587 N.Y.S.2d 681, 684 (A.D. 2d.
1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994). The parties vigorously disputed whether or not
Carbone actually received high recyclable content trash and/or did serious recycling of
trash coming to his facility before attempting to ship it for final disposal elsewhere. Id.
at 681-83.
19 Id. at 683-86.
L' See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6, C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
L See C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1681; C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 770 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The injunction was later dissolved by the
federal court when the state court upheld the constitutionality of the Clarcstown
ordinance. C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1681.
2w C&A Carbone, 770 F. Supp. at 854 & n.2.
"1 Carbone basically alleged that his recycling operations required that the residue he
generated not be defined as discarded trash otherwise subject to the ordinance, both
because it really originated from out-of-state and because he was performing a beneficial
environmental service. The Court could have limited its holding to recyclers or transfer
stations that receive primarily out-of-area trash. In typical flow control litigation, there is
no dispute about the "quality" of trash generated or about where it is generated; the issue




3. The C&A Carbone Ruling
As in other Court waste cases, the main argument between the parties
and among the Justices was over which of the Court's various Commerce
Clause tests should be applied to the state regulation. The five-vote
majority applied strict scrutiny, finding that flow control was designed to
discriminate against interstate commerce 20 Justice O'Connor, concur-
ring, evaluated under the Pike balancing test but still found impermissible
burdening of interstate commerce.2?3 Justice Souter's three-vote dissent
blended a version of Pike balancing with market participant exemption to
conclude that Clarkstown's ordinance accomplished an important
governmental function without discriminating against or overly burdening
interstate commerce2'
Once it was clear which tests the various Justices would apply, it
became apparent that Clarkstown's ordinance was doomed. As Justice
Souter correctly noted, the majority's choice to link the Clarkstown
ordinance with earlier in-state processing cases meant that the virtually
fatal scrutiny imposed in those earlier cases would negatively determine
Clarkstown's fate."' On the other hand, if a version of the Pike test had
been applied, as the Souter and O'Connor opinions indicated, the strong
odds were that Clarkstown's ordinance would be upheld. Having so much
depend on which test is applied arguably deflects from what should be a
more substantively based Commerce Clause inquiry."6 Nevertheless, for
the foreseeable future, parties arguing dormant Commerce Clause cases
must argue not just the merits of their case, but also, or perhaps instead,
that those merits require application of the test which favors their case.
In applying heightened scrutiny to the C&A Carbone facts, the
majority rejected Clarkstown's claim that flow control regulates in an
evenhanded fashion since it requires all waste, regardless of origin, to go
to a designated facility. Instead, the majority focused upon the discrimina-
C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1680.
Id. at 1687 (O'Connor, J., concuring).
Id. at 1702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 1694-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
In the author's view, indirectly framing the argument in terms of applicable tests
rather than more directly asking if the challenged ordinance unduly burdens commerce
masks the value judgment inherent in dormant Commerce Clause inquiries. See supra note
6. As Justice O'Connor correctly noted, "Where is no clear line separating these
categories. 'In either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute
on both local and interstate activity."' C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurning) (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
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tion against competition inherent in flow control.207 In the majority's
view, Clarkstown could not allow only one private company to receive
Clarkstown's waste and require all Clarkstown residents to use that one
company. This foreclosing of other private handlers from processing
Clarkstown's waste constituted per se discrimination against interstate
commerce.208
The implications of the Court's holding on this issue of competition
are potentially far reaching, involving any municipal or state monopoly
where the state attempts to require its own citizens to use designated
services. Justice Souter argued in dissent that flow control is unlike in-
area processing regulations which the Court previously declared
unconstitutional.2 9 In those earlier cases, the invalidated regulations had
benefitted a group of in-area businesses and increased price of private
goods primarily at the expense of those outside the area where the
processing took place. Flow control, on the other hand, is a monopoly for
public benefit which increases prices primarily for those who have chosen
to institute the monopoly.210
The majority considered these differences either inconsequential
or an exacerbation of problems the Commerce Clause was designed to
prevent. C&A Carbone is thus yet another example of the state (and any
Justices in dissent) arguing at cross purposes to the majority of the
Court. As Justice Kennedy saw it, the "town's own arguments" erased any
doubt about the discriminatory intent of the regulation2  When the
town argued that its "discrimination' was evenhanded because it affected
in-area and out-of-area processors alike, in the majority's view this
meant that there was more discrimination, not less. Any argument that the
town could not safely control waste disposal without completely
controlling waste disposal fell on deaf ears. If monopoly itself was the
evil to be avoided, arguments by the township that related to a perceived
need for monopoly reinforced, rather than abated, constitutional pro-
blems.
C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1682.
Id. at 1683.
Id. at 1694-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
210 Justice O'Connor agreed with at least part of the dissent's argument. She
emphasized that because in-town processors and out-of-towners were similarly
"discriminated" against by Clarkstown's designated monopoly, the case needed to be
evaluated under the Pike test rather than declared per se discriminatory and presumptively
violative of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 1688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor considered this distinction of "more doctrinal significance than the
majority acknowledges." Id. at 1689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71' Id. at 1682.
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Accordingly, for both the majority and Justice O'Connor, the
availability of less discriminatory alternatives to solve health and safety
problems refuted the town's arguments about the need to flow control
waste. Health and safety concerns could always be addressed, at least in
the abstract, by requiring that town-generated waste be handled only in
healthy and safe ways by all waste handlers, including the town-
designated facility.2 From the perspective of the majority and
O'Connor, the only reason to insist on monopoly was an illegitimate
financial one - the town needed a monopoly to cheaply ensure the
financial welfare of its favored facility to the detriment of all competi-
tors. 13 Again, the majority and the town were arguing at cross purpos-
es. The town emphasized that its obligation to address health and safety
concerns was linked to its need to efficibntly and cheaply do so via flow
control.2 4 From the majority's perspective, such linkage was not
constitutionally possible. In the Court's view, this asserted need for a
cheap substitute for evenhanded rigorous regulation proved the economic
protectionistic intent of the regulation and therefore reinforced rather than
lessened the illegitimacy of the monopoly.
4. Limited Post-C&A Carbone "Flow Control" Possibilities
C&A Carbone ruled any flow control measure that absolutely
prohibits competition for trash processing to be unconstitutional2 If
a waste handler or processor wants access to a local market, then the state
cannot absolutely prohibit that access by requiring all trash to go
elsewhere. If a local generator wants to handle his own trash or pay
someone other than the government-approved handler to dispose of it,
then the state cannot say who must handle trash but only how the waste
must be handled. As sweeping as the C&A Carbone holding is, however,
' See id. at 1683 (suggesting as an alternative ordinance one that would contain
"uniform safety regulations enacted without the object to discriminate"); cf id. at 1689-90
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that while an ordinance that does not discriminate
could violate the Commerce Clause by producing a high burden, the interest "could be
achieved by simply requiring that all waste disposed of in the town be properly processed
somewhere").
m Id. at 1683-84; cf. id. at 1690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
214 The town had been ordered to close the dump formerly used for its citizens' trash
disposal, yet it was still obligated to ensure the safe disposal of its citizens' trash. Justice
Souter agreed that this obligation to address a local problem gave the town's monopoly
efforts more a feel of legitimate market participant status rather than of impermissible
economic protectionism. See id. at 1693, 1696-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
z"5 Id. at 1683.
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it does not foreclose a state from, in effect, flow controlling most of the
waste generated by its citizens.
C&A Carbone does not prevent government from funding a non-
monopoly collection service via tax revenues, making that service
available to residents free of additional charge, and then directing the
trash collected via that service to wherever the state wishes and at
whatever cost the state has bid out. Those wishing to buy alternative trash
service, at their own cost, could still do so. Just as a state does not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause when it provides "free" public education
to all who desire it and forces those who want alternative education to
pay additionally for it, so a state which provides trash service at its own
cost to its citizens does not violate .the dormant Commerce Clause as long
as it allows citizens to buy alternative trash services at their own cost
should they desire to do so."6
While some trash critics presumably would argue against any form
of subsidized government trash service,"7 the Court has not yet so
directly reinstituted Lochner-type substantive due process.2 8 Presum-
ably all Carbone asked for in the C&A Carbone case was to be allowed
to compete with government on regulatory terms that would apply to all
trash processors. Carbone's tax dollars which had already gone to
Clarkstown were available for use to directly subsidize whatever trash
services the town wished to provide. But if Carbone could dispose of his
own trash more cheaply by not taking advantage of any government-
provided services for which he had already helped pay, then he must be
allowed that opportunity to shop on the open market, according to the
C&A Carbone Court.2"9
It should be apparent that few individual private generators would be
able to resist highly subsidized government trash services. Accordingly,
de facto flow control survives the C&A Carbone ruling. Carbone, because
he imported as much trash as possible from outside Clarkstown, generated
an incredible volume of trash needing disposal"2 ° As a high-volume
216 Cf. Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming Co., 883 F.2d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1989)
(holding that a county did not violate the Commerce Clause by operating a landfill and
giving preference to local garbage).
27 See, e.g., William L. Kovacs & Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market
Participants in Solid Waste Disposal Services - Fair Competition or the Destruction of
the Private Sector?, 18 ENVlL. L. 779, 815-16 (1988).
21' Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (providing broad substantive due
process analysis).
219 C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1684.
m Id. at 1680.
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generator, he might have been able to negotiate a deal better than only a
partly subsidized government service.
Clarkstown apparently did not subsidize its mandated service at all.
The city's flow control ordinance led to a premium being charged to
generators, so that the financing of the desired facility could take place
quickly.'" This premium was in fact part of the ordinance's constitu-
tional deficiency, according to the majority;, the town tried to claim the
benefits of market participation without putting the government at risk
either financially or to the possibilities of competition. However, in
situations where the municipality does subsidize waste disposal services
for its citizens, only a high-volume generator would likely opt out of the
government-provided service. Unlike the public education analogue, few
"quality" and "ideology" based reasons support opting out of govern-
ment-provided trash services.' A government which votes for, fimds
and provides "free" trash service would probably find few citizens who
would opt out; de facto flow control is the inevitable result of massive
government subsidy.
In sum, the C&_ Carbone decision foreclosed any shortcuts to
market participation for governments which wish to flow control their
citizens' waste. While governments which require their citizens to use
only one trash service violate the Commerce Clause, results very similar
to flow control can be achieved by governments willing to sufficiently
subsidize a preferred service.
2' This financing strategy was not necessarily a bad one, if flow control had been
found to be constitutional. As Justice Souter correctly noted, the town plan of putting the
monetary load at the front end via fees roughly calculated to the volume of waste
generated (i.e., the authorized tipping fee) served as a substitute for bonding measures
which would require the town citizens to pay over longer time and perhaps at higher
interest rates for the trash facility. See C&A Carbone, 114 S. CL at 1693, 1701-02
(Souter, J., dissenting).
' Some may contend that potential Superfund liability is so real and so stiff
that commercial generators, especially of low-level hazardous or special waste, may
wish to opt out of government-subsidized services. The contention is that it makes
sense to ensure that the waste is handled more safely than the government service
might handle it so as to avoid Superfind liability. On the environmentalist side,
it is also at least hypothetically possible that extremely committed conservationists
might opt out of disposal services which fail to recycle or otherwise "properly"
dispose of municipal trash so as to protect the environment. Realistically, it seems
the number of those opting out ofahighly subsidized government program would be few.
Still, this risk of desertion is what distinguishes such market participant flow con-




II. APPLICATION OF THE COURT'S
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE RULINGS TO
KENTUCKY'S WASTE MANAGEMENT REGIME
Like the statutory waste management schemes in most states, the
relevant provisions in the Kentucky Revised Statutes are the product of
neither a single legislative session m nor a single will even in any
' Although the 1991 Special Session created numerous new waste management
provisions, significant aspects of Kentucky's waste management program were in place
prior to the 1991 legislature's action. Chapter 109 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes,
vesting waste management authority in counties and/or in "109" boards created by
agreements between counties, remained largely unchanged by the Special Session. The
power of the Cabinet to set technical conditions for and issue permits under § 224.40-310
of the Kentucky Revised Statutes similarly continued basically unmodified by the
legislature's action. For example, prior to the 1991 Special Session, as part of the
Wilkinson administration's effort to capture the environmental initiative, the Cabinet
issued, under existing regulatory powers, emergency regulations preventing landfills from
increasing out-of-state volumes for facilities which did not meet highest technical
requirements. See 401 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 47:132E, 134E, 136E (1990). These regulations
required no legislative action or reform but had the effect of dramatically decreasing the
number of facilities which could operate profitably in the Commonwealth and decreased
some of the externalized costs to be felt by those in the vicinity of disposal facilities.
The 1991 legislature tinkered with but confirmed the broad reach of the Cabinet's
regulatory authority. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.10-.105 (Baldwin 1992)
(granting additional powers rather than decreasing existing powers). Some limited
modifications or clarifications of Cabinet power in particular areas were enacted. For
example, industry dissatisfaction with the delay involved in issuing permits led to the
enactment of § 224.10-220 and § 224.40-310(10), (12), which place time limits on
Cabinet action for permits filed and eliminate the possibility of a de novo hearing on
permits approved as to design but not yet constrncted. Cf. Green Valley EnvtL Corp. v.
Clay, 798 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Ky. 1990) (referencing November 1989 opinion of the
Franklin Circuit Court which had invalidated operating permits issued by the Cabinet
without opportunity for public appeal). Section 224.40-310(11) clarified that the Cabinet
need not rely on industry's certification of compliance with permit conditions but instead
had power to conduct timely independent inspections to insure a facility was being built
in conformity to permit specifications.
Authorization to charge compensatory fees under § 68.178 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes predated the 1991 Special Session. The original administration-proposed
legislation for the 1991 Special Session included modifying § 68.178 to allow significant-
ly increased fees designed to deter out-of-state waste, but this proposal was abandoned
in light of Government Suppliers Consolidated Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739
(S.D. Ind. 1990), declaring Indiana's similar system unconstitutional. Finally, the
ambiguity regarding how much power local government has to act regarding a disposal
facility's design or operation, see infra notes 229-50 and accompanying text, was not
eliminated by the 1991 Special Session.
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particular session. The result of different and often conflicting political
pressures, Kentucky's waste management statutes attempt to address many
different waste concerns.' In assessing how much of this legislation
remains constitutional in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedents,
especially of the last three years, it is important to reemphasize that there
is not one legislative package or intent, but there is rather a collection of
disparate pieces. The pieces occasionally seem designed to work
harmoniously together around a single principle, but more often they
seem thrown together as a result of political horsetrading, compromise,
and perceived waste needs of the moment. The resulting conglomeration
addresses related issues, often without a unifying principle, or perhaps
The main changes in waste management wrought by the 1991 Special Session
included the following: putting teeth into requirements that local government realistically
plan for and manage local waste, giving the Cabinet tools to more seriously track waste
travelling into the Commonwealth, and giving the Cabinet power to keep closer oversight
of those operating in the waste industry. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.43-310, .43-
315(4), .43-360 (Baldwin 1992).
2 The waste management statutes try to address many different types of problems,
including those dealing with waste tires, lead batteries, composting, permit fees, hospital
incinerators, and substandard landfills. Most of these provisions have nothing to do with
limiting out-of-area waste but instead address what Kentuckians must do with the waste
they produce and how they must plan for disposal of that waste.
Some Kentucky statutes require development of programs or provide incentives or
financial assistance to encourage waste reduction. For example, under § 224.10-610
through .10-650, the Cabinet has the power, duty, and some funding to promote recycling,
encourage composting, and increase education regarding waste reduction and manage-
ment. Similarly, under § 224.43-710 through .43-730, technical and financial assistance
is provided to local communities for forming and implementing waste management and
reduction plans. Sections 132.200, 139.480, and 152.052 provide tax breaks or incentives
for recycling, while §§ 45A.520 through .540 include provisions to encourage state
agencies and those who contract with them to use recycled goods.
Only provisions targeted solely at outsiders, such as the consent-to-service
requirements of § 224.43-380 and the 25% differential fee possible under § 68.178,
should be viewed as presumptively unconstitutional under current Court precedent. Other
related aspects of Kentucky's regulation of waste which impose potentially significant
burdens on outsiders do not seem necessarily aimed at controlling or discriminating
against out-of-state waste. For example, the disclosure of background information
mandated by § 224.40-330 and the manifest requirements of § 224.43-335 are both
potentially good ways to ensure that only proper waste ends up being disposed at facilities
in Kentucky, regardless of origin. See also infra notes 289-300 and accompanying text
(discussing constitutionality of such evenhanded regulatory measures). In sum, since there
is no single controlling impetus behind the many different statutes, one statute does not
necessarily fail because an arguably related statute is found to be unconstitutional.
Additionally, given the divergent motivations behind statutes, it is too difficult to
determine how related statutes actually are.
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even with conflicting reasons motivating the passage of sets of statutes which
must attempt to operate in conjunction with each other. The job of "discern-
ing!' legislative intent in such situations is not so much one of being true to
the reality of legislative vision(s), as it is one of imposing upon statutes
priorities of purpose and/or of employing presumptions which attribute to the
legislature desires and preferences it probably did not have and certainly did
not articulate.
Two preliminary problems involved in assessing the constitutionality of
Kentucky's waste statutes demonstrate the observations of the preceding
paragraph. First, since many purportedly unconstitutional actions are taken at
the local rather than state level, the amount of local control possible under the
Kentucky waste management system must be determined. This task is not
easy, given that ambiguity seems deliberately to have been left in the waste
statutes regarding preemption issues, with all interested sides perhaps fearing
a loss if the amount of local control had been conspicuously clarified. Second,
in situations where the legislature probably intended an action that would now
clearly be unconstitutional, but the wording of the statute itself is not
unconstitutional, the problem of what the language now should mean comes
to the fore. These two issues are addressed in the immediately succeeding
parts of this Article, before the Article then turns to a discussion of the
constitutionality of particular provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
A. Statutes Motivated by Unconstitutional Intent Still Can
Constitutionally Control Waste Planning
One working premise of the 1991 Special Session was that the number
of disposal facilities to be allowed to operate in Kentucky was to be driven
by capacity needs identified in local Kentucky government plans. The
additional assumption was that private in-state facilities could be captured
primarily for in-state use. Such capture is clearly unconstitutional under Fort
Gratiot.Y6 Yet the statutory language intended to authorize capture of in-
area and in-state facilities for in-area and in-state use does not require capture;
it just assumes and permits it. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the
language of related statutes, while probably assuming that capture would
occur, does not authorize capture, and in fact can be construed neutrally to
accomplish other waste management goals which the legislature may or may
22 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.40-315 (Baldwin 1992) (denying approval
of a disposal facility construction or expansion permit that is inconsistent with "[t]he
capacity needs identified in the area solid waste management plan").
' See supra notes 77-101 and accompanying text.
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not have intended, if it had realized that capture ofprivate facilities for in-area
waste would later be declared unconstitutional
For example, the goal of limiting the amount of solid waste disposed of
in the Commonwealth, enunciated at section 224.43-010 of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes, probably originally assumed that most facilities in the
Commonwealthwouldbehandlingprimarily Commonwealth-generatedwaste
and thus that a decrease of amounts disposed in-state 7 would correspond
to and reflect true waste reduction by Kentucky generators. Only if Kentucky
facilities were handling primarily or solely in-state waste could measuring the
amount of waste disposed of at Kentucky landfills be used as a shortcut to
see if waste reduction by Kentucky generators was occurring. But since the
language of section 224.43-010 is source-neutral, these provisions currently
can be read as a legislative directive to limit environmental harm caused by
disposal in the Commonwealth and to encourage alternatives to land disposal.
Decreasing the amount oftotal landfill capacity available in the state, in other
words, is a rationally based legislative solution to the problems of landfilling,
apart from any desire to capture private facilities.
The legislature could, of course, revisit provisions which were probably
designed to be implemented in what is now seen to be an unconstitutional
manner, in the meantime, residual constitutional legislative directives should
be implemented. Courts may presume that the legislature still intends its valid
words to have effect, even when other portions of a statutory scheme are
found to be unconstitutional. This principle of construing remainders
constitutionally rather than ignoring legislative directives has important
ramifications for construing statutes governing local planning.
B. Significant Local Control Is Possible
The issue of how much control local government should have over waste
planning consumed much fiegotiation in the 1991 Special Session. The pre-
m See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.43-010(4) (Baldwin 1992) (stating as the goal of
the state the reduction of solid waste disposed of at municipal facilities).
22 Of course, since neither local government nor the state can reserve any decreased
private capacity for local or in-state use under Fort Gratiot, the practical problems of how
local and state governments would be able to dispose of locally generated trash if there
is a decrease in landfill capacity could become significant. Conceivably, local government
would be forced to export at increased cost to out-of-state facilities. It is this evenhanded-
ness and reality of local burden (i.e., potentially significantly increased cost) accompany-
ing an evenhanded cap on landfilling which reinforces the constitutionality of the
measure. If the legislature has really said that landfill capacity should be reduced (via a
requirement that less total waste be disposed of in the Commonwealth), then that directive
cannot be ignored when the costs associated with the directive become real.
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Fort Gratiot belief that local government might be able to exclude out-of-
state waste as part of a comprehensive planning process partly contributed
to the statutory emphasis upon local plans determining landfill capacity
needs. Although these legislative assumptions about ability to capture
private facilities for local use were clearly ruled unconstitutional in Fort
Gratiot, the language emphasizing local planning, since it does not
require capture, still validly can be implemented. Yet when the local
government attempts to use its local planning authority in ways which
severely affect interstate waste interests, burdened parties may claim that
local government is exceeding its statutory mandate and should be
preempted from regulating. Accordingly, the issue of how much local
control is possible under the Kentucky regime must often be addressed
in conjunction with challenges brought under the Commerce Clause.
1. The Starting Point of Shared Authority
Kentucky statutes, in many areas of waste management, unfortunately
do not unambiguously declare how much authority local government has
to manage waste. The statutes do, however, clearly indicate some amount
of local power, by emphasizing a shared state and local responsibility for
waste management. The state, for example, sets overall goals for waste
reduction and management, promulgates technical and operational
requirements for facilitiesuo and supervises to make sure that govern-
ments develop and implement local plans"' and that those who handle
or process waste do so according to Cabinet regulations 2 The local
government 3 is required to provide some form of universal trash
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.43-310, .43-340(1) (Baldwin 1992).
'0 See, e.g., id. §§ 224.40-305, .40-310, .40-605.
23' See, e.g., id. § 224.43-340(10), (11).
232 See, e.g., id. § 224.40-650.
233 The "local" component of Kentucky waste management planning is factually more
complicated than the text indicates. Under § 224.43-340 and § 224.43-345, "local
governing bodies" are given the primary role for local waste management. These local
governing bodies need not consist of single counties and in metropolitan areas require a
working out of jurisdictional power sharing between the city and the county. See id. §
224.43-340.
In some waste management areas, however, the counties also apparently exercise
waste powers independently, or at least co-extensively, with the local governing bodies.
See, e.g., id. § 109.041(1) (Supp. 1993). As originally offered by Govemor Wilkinson,
regional development districts also played a much larger role in waste management. This
offer was resisted by counties as a potential power grab, and the final version of § 147A-
140 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes accordingly limited the role that area development
districts could play in waste management.
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collection,' is obligated to develop a local plan for waste manage-
ment," and is given significant organizational and contracting authority
under Chapter 109 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to implement the
locally developed waste plan.' When Kentucky statutes explicitly give
local government power to act in waste management, there can be no
argument of absolute preemption, just disagreement as to what the
statutory terms mean in relation to other statutory provisions which
explicitly also give the Cabinet power to act.
On the other hand, even when statutes specifically do preempt local
government from regulating, there may still be an indication that some
otherwise extant local power has been diminished or removed. In the
absence of the preemptive statute, in other words, the assumption would
be that the local government had power to regulate. Relatively few
examples exist where Kentucky waste management statutes specifically
indicate that only the Cabinet may regulate. One example, section
109.041(4) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, specifically provides that
"no county or waste management district shall regulate special
wastes." 7 The only thing left to argue about under such a statute is
what it means to "regulate" and whether the county may take actions that
would affect special waste which would not be considered, for purposes
of the preemptive statute, "regulating" it.' The additional implication,
23 See id. § 224.43-315 (Baldwin 1992).
" See id. §§ 224.43-340, .43-345.
235 Some waste statutes grant more specific waste management powers to local
government. For example, under § 68.178 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the local
county government may charge and collect license fees against any waste disposal facility
operating in the county. Under § 224.43-340(12) and § 109.042, the local government
may hire local enforcement officers to ensure that disposal facilities are operating
according to applicable state regulations.
The home rule provisions of § 67.083(3) and (6) also grant Kentucky counties broad
but ambiguous authority to regulate trash. See, e.g., 7 9 Op. Att'yGen. 84 (1979) (stating
that county may require solid waste hauers to tansport all waste to a county-operated
facility); 82 Op. Att'y Gen. 236 (1982) (stating that county may direct residents to use
county receptacles and prohibit others from using such). But cf infra notes 259-67 and
accompanying text (indicating that any such mandatory flow control, while not preempted,
would be unconstitutional).
, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 109.041(4) (Baldwin Supp. 1993). Special wastes include
particular enumerated waste products, as well as "[o]ther wastes ... designated special
wastes by the Cabinet." Id. § 224.50-760(1) (Baldwin 1992). Additionally, § 224.01-
010(31)(a) excludes from the definition of solid waste those special wastes designated by
§ 224.50-760. Given the explicit exclusions of these provisions, any waste which the
Cabinet designates as special waste is not capable of being directly regulated by a local
governing body.
"3 Section 109.041 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes does not preempt, for example,
1994-951
608 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 83
however, is that local government probably has power to regulate other
types of waste for which its power has not thus been specifically
preempted.
In at least two types of situations, local government should not be
preempted from regulating. In "unexercised preemption!' situations, the
local government still has room to act because preemptive state power has
not yet been fully exercised. In "consistent with" situations, local
regulation is not preempted because it complements state authority by
addressing different regulatory concerns. Because many of the disputes
in Kentucky about how much local control can be exercised involve these
two types of situations, 9 the preliminary answer to the question of
how much authority local government has to regulate waste is "quite a
lot."240
the siting aspects of local zoning regulations, but it relates more to how special wastes
must be treated and handled and to what types of design requirements might be required
for facilities which dispose of special wastes. Cf. 92 Op. Att'yGen. 33 (1992) (stating that
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.324 does preempt a local government from objecting to the
siting of a landfill for utility waste, so long as the utility waste was produced incidentally
to the utility's production of power).
-9 A third type of situation, where local government would only sometimes get to
regulate, involves "more stringent than" situations. These are situations where the local
government argues that its regulations may coexist with state action because the state only
provides minimums rather than exclusively sets standards. See generally KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 67.083(6) (Baldwin 1992).
Due to space constraints, these types of situations cannot be explored even in cursory
fashion here. Every time a local governing body attempts to impose additional liner or
other engineering requirements for a sanitary landfill, the question of whether such local
regulation is preempted comes to the forefront. Because each such local regulation must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, in comparison to the state regulatory power being
exercised by the Cabinet, it would significantly expand this Article to explore "more
stringent than" preemption adequately here. Additionally, the primary "local control"
disputes which dominated the 1991 special legislative process and which have caused
post-1991 friction between the Cabinet and local governments have involved more basic
issues of what the local government may say about siting landfills or excluding waste
rather than about these other very important matters.
I As indicated by the comparison to federal preemption cases in succeeding text,
analogy to federal preemption law may be instructive as to how preemption analysis
should proceed under Kentucky law. Although theoretically distinct, preemption under
both Kentucky and federal precedents seems to proceed along similar lines.
The leading Kentucky preemption case, Commonwealth v. Do, Inc., 674 S.W.2d 519
(Ky. 1984), seems basically in harmony with federal preemption law regarding types o
preemption. In Do, Louisville and Jefferson County had instituted criminal charges agan
defendant Do for violation of local health regulations involving Do'spaint operations. D
argued that the legislature's delegation to the Cabinet for Human Resources of a statewik
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2. Unexercised Preemption
In some Kentucky waste situations, the state potentially could prevent
localities from regulating but has not yet done so.241 For example, under
section 189.231(3) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, "[t]he Secretary of
Transportation may restrict or regulate traffic upon state-maintained
highways in such a manner as is reasonably necessary to promote the
safety of the traveling public." Under this statute, in combination with
other statutes, 2 the Transportation Cabinet could declare that hazard-
ous waste should travel only on certain state and county roads. But the
statute does not require the Secretary to regulate; it uses the permissive
"may." Accordingly, if a local community, concerned about the transport
of hazardous waste through the community, wished to regulate so that
waste would travel on certain routes and avoid others, this power would
not be preempted until and unless the Secretary promulgated its own
routes&u3 The example illustrates the larger point that in situations
lead poisoning prevention program preempted local government's ability to regulate in the
area. Id. at 520-21. The Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed, finding that since the
program at issue specifically included funding for local initiatives, some local power to
regulate must exist. Id. at 521. Additionally, the court examined statutory provisions
outside of the statewide lead paint prevention program and found local power generally
to regulate public health. The court emphasized that localities were not prohibited from
regulating just because the state had acted in the same area. Id. The key inquiries would
be whether there was truly conflict between what both governments were asking the
defendant to do and whether the exercise of complementary authority was in the public
interest. See id. at 522.
The U.S. Supreme Court's most recent statements regarding preemption in an
environmental context are contained in Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n,
112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992) (holding that an Illinois hazardous waste worker-training law was
impliedly preempted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act), and Wisconsin
Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (holding that a local ordinance
regulating pesticides was not preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act).
"4 The analogy to federal situations is helpful. For example, in Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 171-73 (1978), the Court ruled that the Coast Guard, because
it had not yet chosen to issue regulations governing pilotage, had not preempted local tug
escort requirements. C. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265-66 (1976) (stating
that the EPA did not have veto power over some parts of state implementation plans
because of EPA policy giving states discretion regarding what to include in their
implementation plans). The federal agency might later change its mind and issue
regulations which could take away local power to regulate, but in the meantime the local
power is not preempted.
2 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.410(1) (Baldwin 1992) (giving the Secretary
authority to regulate intrastate transport of hazardous materials).
' The question at this point is just whether the local government may act at all, not
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where discretionary state authority has not yet been implemented, local
government retains whatever police power regulatory authority it
otherwise would possess.
3. "Consistent with" Regulations
To capture the idea of what is involved in "consistent with!'
preemption debates, consider the following not entirely hypothetical
situation.' A local community desires to limit the amount of special
waste disposed of at local, privately owned facilities. Under section
109.041 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, as previously noted, local
governments are prohibited from regulating special waste?'5 But under
section 224.40-315, the Cabinet shall not approve permits to expand or
construct municipal solid waste disposal facilities unless consistent with
the relevant local plan. May a local government limit in its plan the
amount of landfilling going on in the community and thereby indirectly
limit how much commercial disposal of special waste takes place? The
answer seems to be "yes," as an example of the local government
regulating "consistently with" and not necessarily in frustration of the
state's exclusive control over special waste regulation. The key is
determining the scope of each government's power to regulate.
The Kentucky municipal solid waste disposal facility permitting
scheme is predicated upon the local governing body's determination of
how much disposal capacity is needed in the area. 6 Although the local
whether its actions would violate other provisions of law, especially the Commerce
Clause. In the truck-routing hypothetical, to survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny,
the local regulation could not prohibit interstate movement of goods through the local
territory, regardless of how hazardous. Cf., e.g., Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel
County, 438 A.2d 269, 278 (Md. 1981) (holding that differential treatment of in-area and
out-of-area waste and fees and manifest requirements that would impose unreasonable
burdens violate Commerce Clause). Assuming that a routing ordinance applied
evenhandedly and did not unreasonably restrict movement of goods through the local
territory, it probably would survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
2 Questions related to the concerns expressed in this hypothetical were asked of the
Attorney General's office during the time the author worked there. The answers suggested
in this Article of course reflect only the author's personal opinion on these matters.
's See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
24 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.40-315, .43-345 (Baldwin 1992). The
assumption, now constitutionally infirm, was that capacity could be authorized for locally
generated trash, with out-of-area trash being required to receive separate authorization.
Yet limiting out-of-area trash was hardly the sole or even primary goal of required local
waste management planning. Other elements of the statutory framework emphasize the
need for waste reduction, including portions which encourage recycling and discourage
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government is prohibited from directly controlling how special waste may
be handled, it is encouraged to seek waste reduction generally and to look
for ways to force waste generators to seek alternatives to landflling.
Prohibiting or placing caps on the amount of landfilling that goes on in
the area is one of the most direct ways to discourage easy landfilling,
including easy landfilling of special wastes. Additionally, nothing in the
statutory waste management scheme indicates that private property
owners (either generators or proposed disposers) have a vested right to
landfill. Together with the home rule provisions of section 67.083 and the
zoning provisions of chapter 100 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the
waste management aspects of section 224 give local governments room
enough to formulate local waste management plans that prohibit or
severely limit private landflling in the planning unit's boundaries.247
landfilling. See, e.g., id. §§ 224.43-010, -345(g); see also 401 KY. ADMIN. REoS. 49:011
(1994) (governing contents of solid waste management plans required to be prepared by
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.43-345 and incorporating by reference DVISION OF WASTE
MANAGEMENT, GUIDEL2NES FOR PREPARATION OF AN AREA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
PLAN (1992) [hereinafter GUDELwES )). The author thanks Vicki Pettus of the Cabinet for
passing the guidelines on to him.
' While § 2 24 .4 3-34 5(l)(g)(3) requires "[e]stablishment of a siting procedure and
development program to assure the orderly location, development, and financing of new
or expanded municipal solid waste management facilities," this part does not, in
conjunction with the rest of the statute, require local communities to encourage disposal
facilities to be sited in the area. Since privately owned landfills are the least favored
disposal alternative under § 224.43-010(3), it would not make sense for proliferation of
landfills to be considered "the optimal alternative[ ]" required to be implemented under
§ 224. 43-345(1)(g). The real goal of siting is to provide access to disposal facilities for
trash generated by the local community. As the remainder of § 224.43-345(l)(g)(3)
indicates, "ftJhe plan shall demonstrate how all persons in the planning area will within
the near future have reasonable opportunity to dispose of their waste in a manner that
complies with state and federal laws." Local facilities would be sited to prevent open
dumping, cf. id. § 224 .43-34 5(l)(g)(3), and to assure adequate capacity for locally
generated trash, cfj id. § 224.43-345(1)(l), (m). However, the assumption that local private
disposal facilities could be compelled to address either problem is now constitutionally
incorrect. Except for government-owned disposal facilities, cf. GUIDELIFS, supra note
246, at ch. II, new disposal facilities cannot be created with the understanding that they
will handle locally generated trash. Such would be unconstitutional under Fort Gratiot.
See also infra notes 270-80 and accompanying text.
Construing remainders constitutionally, the monitoring and regulation of private
facilities encouraged in connection with local planning should, post-Fort Gratiot, therefore
be read to relate to health and safety concerns rather than to capacity concerns. Regulation
of facilities for health and safety reasons seems, via the local planning statute, to be a
shared Cabinet and local government responsibility inmany situations. See, e.g., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 224.43-345(1)(g)(1) (Baldwin 1992) (indicating local regulations and
ordinances may be passed to govern proper, safe, and sanitary management of solid waste
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If a local waste management plan, for example, capped total daily
landfilling at 500 tons, then private area landfills should not be able to
accept special waste on top of these plan limits.2 So long as the limits
are directed to landfilting rather than to a particular type of land-
filling,249 the local regulation is not at cross purposes to what the state
in the area covered by the plan). The most dramatic form of landfill regula-
tion - prohibition of the entire activity - seems authorized by the local planning aspects
of § 224.
m Although the Cabinet has sometimes taken the position that local plans can only
set limits for municipal solid waste to be landfilled in the area, see, eg., Letter from
Secretary Phil Shepherd to Union County Judge Executive Veatch (Apr. 21, 1992) (on file
with the author), this interpretation is not justified by the overall statutory scheme or
language. The Cabinet apparently puts improper emphasis on § 224.43-345(l)(1), which
speaks in terms of a plan authorizing capacity only for out-of-area munipal solid waste.
The strategy of preserving in-area facilities primarily for in-area use, however, (which is
behind authorizing separate capacity for out-of-area waste, whether municipal or
otherwise), is unconstitutional under Fort Gratiot. It is accordingly risky to rely upon
what is at least a partially unconstitutional statutory provision for the authority of local
governing bodies to place capacity limits on anything. As demonstrated above, sources
of authority for a local governing body to impose capacity limits on a landfill's operations
are found outside of § 224.43-345(l)(1). Whatever that section did or currently does mean,
if local government is given power by other statutes to limit landfilling in its borders,
then the Cabinet is obliged to give this local determination of what is in the locality's best
interests some deference unless the local power to regulate is preempted by other
provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Deference to local plans is mandated by § 224.40-315. Under subsection (2) of that
statute, no permit to construct or expand a municipal solid waste disposal facility cam be
granted unless the application is consistent with several things, including not only "[the
capacity needs identified in the area solid waste management plan," but also "[other
elements of the area solid waste management plan." If a local governing body has
included in its plan absolute limits on landflling activity, there is no reason these should
not be considered "other elements" of the plan for purposes of § 224A0-315. So long as
power to include these elements in the plan existed, the deference is required.
49 A different situation would be posed by a local ordinance which prohibited special
waste landfilling per se. Such targeting of special waste would be preempted by the
Cabinet's conclusions that special waste can be landfilled. In other words, if a local
government permitted some landfllling but purported to ban all landfilling of special
waste, such local regulation would be in conflict with the Cabinet's determination that it
is permissible to landfill special waste. However, a local determination that only a certain
amount of landfilling shall take place, without regard to what goes in the landfill, would
not be preempted. But qf. supra note 238 (describing the rare situation of electric utility
special waste preemption should a utility desire to erect a facility just for its special waste
by-products).
The practical reality is that much special waste ends up being disposed of at
municipal solid waste facilities. Under § 224.01-010(15), amunicipal solid waste disposal
facility is defined to include any facility "where the final deposition of any amount of
[Vol. 83
OUT-OF-STATE WASTE
exclusively is allowed to regulate but rather is aimed at a different area
of concern where the local government properly is authorized to speak.
So long as the cap left it to the facility to divide its capacity between
special waste and other waste, local government would not be regulating
special waste so as to trigger the preemption of section 109.041 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
In these situations of "consistent with!' preemption analysis, the key
is determining the scope of the legislature's intended authorizations of
power to both state and local governments. Rather than viewing these as
either/or situations where if the state gets to regulate the locals do not, the
better approach is to look for intersecting circles of authority. Where the
local government is acting pursuant to statutory authority in the form of
a circle different from that defining how the state exclusively may
regulate, the overlap of authorizations should be construed to allow both
levels of government to act. Thus, there can be no preemption of local
authority to regulate within its circle, even though the local regulation
overlaps with state level concerns. °
municipal solid waste occurs, whether or not mixed with or including other waste allowed
under Subtitle D of the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act." Special waste
is a type of Subtitle D waste. The point is that many landfills, when they are constructed
and operated, desire to take a variety of wastes, so long as they can obtain approval from
the Cabinet on technical grounds that their facility is constructed with adequate
safeguards to protect against the type of waste desired to be handled. The commodity
which the landfill operator has to offer is airspace (i.e., capacity), and it is in his
economic interest to sell that airspace to the highest and/or most dependable bidders.
Special waste, because it possesses some of the characteristics of RCRA Subtitle C waste,
sometimes can command a higher per unit disposal price. Alternatively, some special
wastes, like dirt from around leaking underground storage tanks (if not too contaminated),
might be beneficial to the landfill operator as possible cover material or absorbent which
could be used to layer other wastes received or to reduce the amount of dirt which the
landfill operator otherwise would have to put in at his cost in order to sandwich disposal
layers.
'
5 Comparison to federal preemption cases seems to confirm this analysis. In Pacific
Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461
U.S. 190, 222-23 (1983), for example, the Court affirmed a state's denial of a nuclear
facility permit on financial grounds related to spent fuel disposal costs, even though the
exclusive power to regulate all safety aspects of a nuclear plant's operations, including
what should be done with spent fuel, rested with the federal Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Similarly, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 246 (1984), the
Court found that normal state punitive damages law was not preempted for nuclear
accidents causing bodily injury, even though the punitive damage awards permitted under
state law may hamper the mission of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to encourage
siting of facilities and use of nuclear power.
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C. Several Parts of Kentucky's Waste Management Scheme Violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause
1. Differential Fees Charged
In Carpenter v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
upheld the constitutionality of a statute which allowed Kentucky counties
to charge a waste facility license fee 25% higher for out-of-area waste,
with the total license fee for such waste being up to 6.25% of gross
receipts received for such waste by the solid waste disposal facility.'
Before the extra 1.25% could be charged for out-of-area waste, the local
government must have found the differential to be reasonably related to
additional governmental services required because of the out-of-area
waste. 22 Carpenter is no longer good precedent in light of the Oregon
DEQ decision, and a fresh challenge should result in a court declaring the
differential fee portion of section 68.178 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes to be unconstitutional."ss
The Carpenter court rejected challenges that this compensatory fee
statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Although the landfill
owner alleged both facial discrimination and discrimination in effect, he
offered no real counter-argument to the Commonwealth's position that the
fee at issue was connected to unique problems presented by out-of-state
waste. In a battle of assertions, the Carpenter court correctly ruled that
the statute was presumed to be reasonably related, so long as the
Commonwealth's arguments seemed to be logical.' At any rate, since
Carpenter offered no significant proof to counter the Commonwealth's
position, the fee was uphelde'
The likelihood of continuing to be able to defend differential fees on
grounds of alleged differential harms is slim. Given the Court's insistence
in Oregon DEQ that all differential fees will be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny, the possibility of less discriminatory alternatives to fees seems
2 See 831 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (setting forth the relevant provisions
of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 68.178(2) (Baldwin 1992)).
' See id. Examples of such services include "impacts on roads, litter control or
emergency services." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 68.178(2)(b) (Baldwin 1992).
The Carpenter facility is, of course, bound under principles of res judicata to
judicial determinations that the fee assessed was valid. Similarly, any agreements entered
into between landfill owners and counties which took into account the possible
unconstitutionality of § 68.178, yet bound the owner to pay a fee, would be presumed
valid as voluntary agreements between the parties on a disputed or ambiguous point.




sure to defeat arguments about those fees being a tight fit to a unique
problem.'
This insistence leaves only the possibility of arguing that the local
character of section 68.178 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes makes the
taxing event substantially equivalent as required by the Oregon DEQ
Court. Such is a losing argument. Although the causal connection
between harms caused to local government by out-of-area waste being
locally deposited is clear and direct, reality of harms was not the focus
of the Court's insistence upon substantial equivalence in Oregon
DEQ.' Under the Oregon DEQ logic, the problem with any fee that
attempts to make up through general revenues what it charges directly to
out-of-area waste is that such a different type of taxing event means
generators of the same type waste from outside the area may be charged
more by the local government for causing the same harm or receiving the
same service. Although the Oregon DEQ emphasis and rationale may be
incorrect, the Court has clearly spoken. In short, that portion of section
68.178 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes which permits differential fees
is unconstitutional2 8
2 See supra notes 137-38, 212-14.
2 Even absent the substantial equivalence requirement, other problems with portions
of the differential fee authorized under § 68.178 exist. Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot
clearly rejected the argument that the difficulty of siting disposal facilities, even where
there is strong obligation to care for locally generated trash, can justify a state or local
government in imposing burdens of local planning needs on out-of-area trash (at least
where private disposal facilities are involved). Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626; Fort
Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028. It logically follows that compensatory fees may not attempt
to recover for local planning costs related solely to the management of local trash.
Unfortunately, the Kentucky statute authorizes just such improper recoupment for local
planning. In fact, § 68.178(2)(b) explicitly states that its 1.25% differential may be
justified "by showing an unplanned for reduction in waste disposal capacity and a need
to provide for future disposal capacity." This portion of the statute allowing compensatory
fee recovery for state planning regarding local waste and any fees charged pursuant to it
would be unconstitutional under Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot, even had Oregon DEQ
never been decided.
From the state or local community's perspective, increased volumes of out-of-area
waste certainly will eat up available and permitted landfill capacity and clearly will
impose waste planning costs which the government will have to pass on to its own
citizens. But Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot state that these are precisely the sorts of costs
which cannot be imposed via bans on out-of-area trash. It would not make sense to allow
a cost to be imposed through the back door under the label "compensatory fee" when that
cost was explicitly foreclosed at the front door when called a "ban."
28 This fact does not mean that the local government cannot subsidize local waste
generators to give them a competitive advantage against outsiders. See generally supra
notes 153-62 and accompanying text (discussing what ty pe of subsidies should survive
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2. Mandatory Flow Control
As Oregon DEQ dealt a death blow to differential compensatory fees,
C&A Carbone meant the end of mandatory flow control. Under sections
109.059 25' and 109.06226 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, local
government is authorized to flow control all waste within its jurisdiction.
As previously mentioned,e 6 such authority was also exercised in
Kentucky by local government under presumedly valid local police
powers. C&A Carbone made clear that any such mandatory form of flow
control is unconstitutional. However, this fact does not mean that a local
government is without power to attach flow control conditions to waste
services it subsidizes or provides.' Accordingly, the exact form of
flow control instituted at the local level determines the constitutionality
of actual flow control measures.
Brief consideration of two pending federal cases involving challenges
to local Kentucky flow control measures demonstrates the importance of
potential differences in local implementation. In Collection,,Services, Inc.
v. Daviess County, private waste collectors challenge an April, 1994,
Daviess County ordinance requiring all waste collected in Daviess County
to be deposited at facilities owned and operated by the county.263 The
local ordinance seems clearly unconstitutional in light of C&A Carbone.
The only apparent difference between the facts in Daviess County and
C&A Carbone is that the Daviess County waste is being flow controlled
to a government-owned facility. As Justice Souter's C&A Carbone dissent
indicated, it was hardly clear in that case whether to draw the line on
Clarksville's transfer station on the private or public side, given the lease
constitutional attack).
" "Any county or solid waste management district may require the use of any solid
waste management facility or other facility [meeting Cabinet standards] by all persons
situated within the geographical boundaries thereof." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.059
(Baldwin 1992).
' "Any county or waste management district which requires the mandatory use of
any solid waste management facility or other facility pursuant to ... 109.059 may require
the use of any collection system or mode by all persons within the geographical
boundaries thereof." Id. § 109.062.
25 See supra notes 171-72.
See supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
m No. 94-0121 (E.D. Ky. amended complaint filed July 15, 1994). The author is
advised by county representatives that this litigation is presently on "hold," since the
county currently is choosing not to enforce its flow control ordinances and is in the




and buy back arrangement the New York township had negotiated in
connection with the facility.2" More importantly, the unconstitutional
aspects of flow control, according to the C&A Carbone Court, come
about as a result of shutting off competition and are therefore unrelated
to the nature of the facility to which waste is flow controlled. 2  The
private collectors bringing suit against Daviess County cannot be forced
under C&A Carbone to take waste they collect from Daviess County
customers to Daviess County facilities.
The second pending Kentucky flow control case poses potentially
more complicated issues. In Browning-Ferris Industries of Kentucky, Inc.
v. Hardin County Fiscal Court, the unsuccessful bidder for a local
collection franchise challenges the constitutionality of Hardin County's
requirements that successful bidders must flow control collected waste to
the local publicly owned facility. 6  It is unclear from the complaint
whether the franchise being bidded purports to be a truly exclusive
franchise (thus enabling the successful bidder to collect all trash
generated in Hardin County). If so, such a truly monopolistic franchise
would be unconstitutional under C&A Carbone. It would be easy,
however, to correct constitutional infirmities in any franchise bid
solicitation or agreement. The local government could choose not to
enforce any exclusive rights to collect but still could subsidize or
encourage use of the winning service so as to make it worthwhile for
bidders to seek a franchise.2"
Plaintiff BFI, however, apparently does not seek invalidation of the
exclusive nature of any franchise awarded, which is what makes this case
C&A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1694-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
's Market participant logic only protects from Commerce Clause scrutiny when the
actions of the transfer station are being questioned. A publicly owned transfer station, for
example, could charge differential fees or refuse to accept out-of-area waste and not
violate the Commerce Clause. See also infra notes 281-88 (discussing market participant
waste situations). But when the government flow controls, the fact that it flow controls
to a publicly owned facility does not invest the flow controlling action with market
participant status. From the perspective of ousted competitors, the destination of the
waste, whether to a government or a privately owned facility, does not matter, they are
still unable to service former customers.
26' No. C94-0416 L(A) (W.D. Ky. filed July 1, 1994).
Simply using local government mailing tools to publicize the benefits of using the
government-sponsored franchise may be enough to encourage widespread use of a collection
service whose bid price is competitive. Space limitations prevent a detailing of all possibilities
which a creative local government might explore to encourage use of a favored collection
facility. Additionally, nothing in C&A Carbone requires that any and all comers be permitted
access to local trash markets. A local government may impose evenhanded standards or
requirements applicable to all trash collectors without violating the Commerce Clause.
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interesting and the plaintiff's legal position untenable. In its prayer for
relief, BFI instead requests the court to order Hardin County to execute
an exclusive franchise with it, minus any restrictions on where BFI would
have to take the collected waste. Such a "have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too"
result is definitely not required by the dormant Commerce Clause and in
fact is opposite to the logic of the C&A Carbone decision. If the
franchise is exclusive, it is that exclusivity which violates the dormant
Commerce Clause's protections, according to the C&A Carbone Court.
On the other hand, if the franchise is not exclusive, it is like public
education or any other state-supported service. Private competitors may
compete for any business still available, on whatever terms they are able
to negotiate. But they can demand neither that a non-exclusive franchise
include only terms with which they feel comfortable, nor that a franchise
stay exclusive and then claim that this exclusivity does not violate the
Commerce Clause. Under a non-exclusive franchise, Hardin County could
direct franchised waste wherever it wants. This case thus demonstrates the
potential for both constitutional and unconstitutional flow control,
depending on how a local waste management plan is implemented.
3. Consent-to-Service Only for Out-of-Staters
Section 224.43-380(1) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes states that no
person may transport or cause to be transported solid waste from outside
Kentucky to a disposal facility in Kentucky unless all persons in the
waste chain have irrevocably consented in writing to the jurisdiction of
Kentucky courts for actions arising out of their waste disposal actions.
The similar Ohio provision upon which Kentucky's statute was based was
declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in National Solid
Waste Management Association v. Voinovich.2" Although argument can
be made that Kentucky's consent-to-service statute stands in a more
constitutionally defensible position than that of Ohio because it is coupled
with other regulatory measures for keeping track of waste wherever
763 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. Ohio 1991), rev'd and remanded, 959 F.2d 590 (6th Cir.
1992). In reversing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of waste industry, the
Sixth Circuit ruled only that Ohio was entitled to its day in court to prove whether its
challenged legislation was tailored closely enough to unique problems caused by out-of-
state waste to permit differential treatment. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v.
Voinovich, 959 F.2d 590, 592 (6th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit opinion focused on
differential fee provisions and largely ignored the consent-to-service aspects of Ohio's
legislation. Id. at 591-93. On the merits, and especially post-Fort Gratiot, ChemWaste,
Oregon DEQ, and C&A Carbone, the Ohio federal district court probably correctly ruled
Ohio's consent-to-service requirements unconstitutional.
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generated, which Ohio's statutes lacked, these arguments cannot ultimate-
ly save the provision, given the strict scrutiny the Court currently
employs against any measures which treat waste or persons differently
because of origin.
Similar to failing arguments in Oregon DEQ, arguments by the
Commonwealth that consent-to-service is not usually needed for in-state
actors since they are already subject to Kentucky's jurisdiction would
likely avail little. The effective two-pronged counter-argument is that: 1)
out-of-state actors also are usually subject to a state's long-arm reach if
their actions affect the Commonwealth, and 2) many in-state actors might
later be as unobtainable for suit as their out-of-state counterparts. In short,
if the consent-to-service provisions are aimed to bring all persons who
handle Kentucky-disposed waste before Kentucky tribunals when
something goes wrong, the provisions target only part of the potential
problem. A less discriminatory alternative of having all actors irrevocably
consent to service, whether their actions occur in-state or out and whether
they haul in-state or out-of-state waste, would put Kentucky to the proof
of demonstrating whether its concerns are really an inability to obtain
jurisdiction or instead are merely the expression of a desire to hassle out-
of-staters who wish to ship waste to Kentucky. In sum, because height-
ened scrutiny would be triggered by this provision which targets
outsiders, the consent-to-service provisions of section 224.43-380(1) of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes likely would be found unconstitutional in
any lawsuit by outsiders against whom the provisions might be en-
forced. 69
4. Capture of Private Facilities for
In-Area or In-State Waste
As discussed previously, one of the underlying assumptions to parts
of the 1991 Special Session's work was that it would be possible for a
local community to authorize disposal capacity for in-area private
facilities on the condition that the authorized capacity be reserved for the
community's own waste needs. 7 Fort Gratiot unequivocally declared
such usurpation of private competition unconstitutional.
' The author is not aware, however, of any vigorous enforcement by the Cabinet of
these provisions or of Cabinet promulgation of regulations pursuant to the consent-to-
service legislative mandate. Accordingly, the issue may not be ripe for adjudication in any
tribunal and is of no concern to waste industry until and unless it is seriously implement-
ed.
2 See supra notes 225-28, 246-47 and accompanying text.
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The assumptions in the Kentucky control ofprivate facilities for local and
state use in fact went much further than the Fort Gratiot facts and were even
less constitutionally defensible. Under the Kentucky logic, as interpreted by
the Cabinet soon after passage of the legislation, communities were thought
to have the power not only to authorize capacity solely for in-area trash but
also to pick and choose sources for any capacity they authorized for out-of-
area trash.27' Kentucky counties thus could authorize capacity solely for
Kentucky counties. Although such county authorizations would blatantly
allow the political subdivisions of the state, acting in concert, to accomplish
a goal prohibited the state as a whole," the Cabinet apparently did not
understand or did not wish to agree with what Philadelphia required.273
Additionally, the Cabinet itself was given some powers by which it might
directly reserve in-state private capacity for in-state use. For example, under
section 224.43-360(2) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the Cabinet was
permitted to allow deviance from otherwise controlling regulations on sub-
standard landfill design to assure capacity for "solid waste generated in
Kentucky" and "industrial solid waste generated in Kentucky as the result of
economic development."'274 Similarly, under section 224.10-105(3) of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes, pending approval of local and state plans, the
Cabinet was given power "[t]o issue, continue in effect, revoke, modify,
suspend, deny or condition permits... as necessary... to meet solid waste
disposal capacity needs of the area and to assure disposal capacity for solid
waste generated in Kentucky." '275 Under subsection (4) of the same statute,
the Cabinet possessed authority to limit the amount of waste accepted at
facilities in the state "as otherwise necessary to assure capacity for disposal
of waste generated in the Commonwealth
276
271 During the summer and fall of 1991, the author attended meetings at which the
Cabinet explained this as its position.
"' Cf. supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (applying similar points to the Fort
Gratiot case).
273 While it certainly would be better from a waste planning standpoint to know that
all Kentucky waste was going to facilities under the Cabinet's direct supervision and that
no new facilities would need to be sited unless they were either needed for Kentucky-
generated waste or desired by the community where they were to be sited, such
reservation of private facilities for public use is not permissible under Fort Gratiot and
Philadelphia.
27The last provision smacks directly of economic protectionism. The waste is being
allowed to go to a facility (presumably at favorable prices since the facility has not had
to comply with the most stringent landfill design requirements) precisely to accommodate
Kentucky's economic development needs.




While the final legislation contained fewer of these direct assertions
of authority to restrict in-state facilities for in-state use than were
contained in the version originally put forth by the governor,2" the fact
that the Cabinet construed ambiguous capacity authorizations to mean that
local bodies could pick and choose out-of-area sources demonstrates
either that an original "feel' in the proposed legislation carried over and
contaminated its later implementation, or at least that ambiguity may be
construed unconstitutionally when desired.
Some courts have argued that an operator, after entering into a side
host agreement which incorporates unconstitutional restrictions27 and
obtaining the financial rewards of that agreement, would be estopped to
challenge its provisions. 9 However, such a result is not certain. In an
action for breach of contract, the defendant operator might be allowed to
argue that the illegality of the contract provisions was a complete defense
to his breach of those provisions," or alternatively, that he was
coerced into agreeing to the terms as unfair pre-conditions for allowing
his permit to be processed. Either way, the arguments and allegations
could tie up the local governing body in potentially expensive and
unnecessary litigation. More immediate problems are posed where
competition for local capacity or permits existed. Granting a permis to
one competitor for unconstitutional reasons would provide the competitor
with ammunition to invalidate the government's actions.
' For example, an early version of § 224.43-310(2) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
contained explicit provisions that disposal capacity exist in the Commonwealth for waste
generated in the Commonwealth and that efforts be encouraged to limit the amount of
out-of-state trash coming into the Commonwealth. The provisions discouraging out-of-
state trash were excised in the final legislation, and the capacity restrictions were toned
down in § 224.43-310(2)(c) and (d) to indicate that the plan more generally should
address capacity needs for in-state generated trash.
' An example of such an agreement would be the local governing body entering into
a long-term contract with a local landfill for disposal of locally generated waste on
condition that the landfill agree to limit the volume of out-of-area waste it accepts at its
facility. The most direct attempt to evade constitutional restrictions through side
agreements would be an agreement that local government would not oppose a facility, but
only on the condition that it accept only trash from certain areas.
' CY. Medical Waste Assocs. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 966 F.2d 148, 153 (4th Cir.
1992) (holding that operator of a medical waste facility was estopped from challenging
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance from which the operator derived permission
to contract its facility and by which it was subject to certain operating restrictions). For
a good statement of current case law regarding whether medical waste can be restricted
by origin, absent estoppel, see BFI Medical Waste Systems, Inc. v. Whatcom County, 983
F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1993).
-0 Cf KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.43-370 (Baldwin 1992) (declaring void any
contracts in conflict with Kentucky waste statutes).
1994-95]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Most of the provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes dealing with
waste planning are not tainted with any assumptions that out-of-area
waste should be handled differently from in-area waste. Background
checks, manifests, recycling incentives, and other evenhanded regulatory
measures are viable ways to ensure that only proper waste is landflled.
These regulatory methods do sometimes place more burden on out-of-area
waste than in-area waste, but that fact is not reason to strike them. If the
statutes are not implemented or applied in discriminatory fashion, then
evenhanded efforts are entitled to judicial deference regarding legitimate
local purpose. However, if states or communities persist in incorporating
into statutes clearly unconstitutional waste management approaches or in
vigorously applying unconstitutional aspects of statutes, they nn the
serious risk that courts will not distinguish the good from the bad.
D. Several Possibilities for Constitutional Regulation Should
Be Explored
Rather than encourage unconstitutional back door deals or pass
questionable legislative measures, Kentuckians should concentrate on
putting teeth into regulatory efforts which stand a realistic chance of
surviving dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. The possibilities for such
state effort can be divided into two broad types: market participant
exemption and evenhanded regulation. Evenhanded regulation can then
also be divided into two subtypes: regulation that treats waste differently
on the basis of its contents (as opposed to its origin) and regulation that
insists that all waste be processed, handled, or tracked in a certain way.
1. Monopolistic Market Participation
Fairly late in the 1991 Special Session committee review process, a
form of market participation legislation was introduced in an effort to
constitutionally solve Kentucky's waste problems.28" ' The specific
system proposed, based on part of Delaware's statewide flow control
regime,82 has now effectively been ruled unconstitutional by C&A
Carbone.283 Ironically, however, the C&A Carbone ruling may make it
"S Representative Pete Worthington proposed the legislation.
22 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001(c)(6), 6002(38), 6010(e)-(g), 6025, 6401-6431
(1991) (stating that Delaware Solid Waste Authority must exclude all out-of-area waste
from publicly owned facilities and must permit only publicly owned facilities within the
designated areas).
' See supra notes 164-214 and accompanying text. Only the part of the Delaware
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easier for states to argue that market participation can be used monopolis-
tically to keep out-of-state waste from coming into most' in-state
landfills.
The way to block out-of-state trash but still provide landfills to
address in-state needs would be to first allow only publicly owned
landfills to be constructed and operate in a state and then to authorize the
publicly owned facilities to handle only in-state generated trash.?
Publicly owned facilities in a competitive environment have successfully
claimed market participant exemption from dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny when they discriminate against out-of-state waste by banning it
or charging it higher fees.28 The question is whether states which allow
publicly owned facilities to be the only landfill game in the state would
still be entitled to claim market participant exemption.
A good argument can be made that preventing private ownership of
landfills does not impede values which the interstate Commerce Clause
is designed to protect.W The C&A Carbone ruling ensures that no state
program requiring all waste generated in Delaware to be flow controlled to Delaware-
owned facilities would be unconstitutional under C&A Carbone. C&A Carbone thus
effectively overruled Harvey & Harvey v. Delaware Solid Waste Authority, 600 V. Supp.
1369 (D. Del. 1985) (holding Delaware's flow control provisions to be constitutional).
' To prevent out-of-state waste from coming into all landfills located within the
state, the state would have to purchase all existing private landfills and then institute
market participant restrictions. Attempted revocation of private landfill permits would
likely produce protracted and uncertain litigation. The prohibitive cost in condemning
existing facilities for state use likely means a lag time for private permits to expire before
all landfills in a state could handle only in-state garbage under a monopolistic market
participant regime.
z Cf. supra note 282 (describing Delaware system).
z' See, e.g., Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 248-51 (3d
Cir. 1989) (stating that a county, recognized by the court as a market participant rather
than a market regulator, legitimately attempted to ',preserve its landfill's capacity for local
residents" through higher fees for, and volume limits on, "distant waste"); LeFrancois v.
Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1212 (D.R.I. 1989) (upholding as constitutional a state
statute criminalizing the disposal of out-of-state waste in a publicly owned landfill where
there was no alternative, privately owned disposal site for such waste); County Comm'rs
v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 18-22 (Md. 1984) (stating that a county acting as a participant
in the business of landfill services could limit the availability of its services to citizens
of the county without violating the Commerce Clause); cf. Waste Aid Sys., Inc. v. Citrus
Co., 613 F. Supp. 102, 107 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (reaching same result as County Comm'rs
under an Equal Protection challenge).
' A state cannot condition the development of natural resources on the requirement
that only the state's own citizens benefit from the development. However, a disposal
facility can be sited in any state which has the political will to build the facility in the
face of local NIMBY opposition. See Cox, supra note 4, at 819-23.
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can hoard all of its citizens' trash within state boundaries. Any out-of-
state competitor who can make in-state generators or haulers a better deal,
under C&A Carbone, cannot be denied the opportunity to service the
local waste market. It is this possibility for interstate commercial
competition, not any particular form of private enterprise, which the
Commerce Clause is designed to protect.!'
What additionally distinguishes such monopolistic market participa-
tion (and indeed any form of market participation) from the anti-
competitive flow control found unconstitutional in C&A Carbone is that
no government can claim the benefits of market participant exemption
until it has put its money where its regulatory mouth is. Market participa-
tion always costs. In sum, what keeps market participation "honest' is
both the possibility of out-of-state competition and the self-inflicted "bite"
of in-state cost. Accordingly, monopolistic market participant exemption
seems a possibility worth exploring for states which want to manage their
own, but only their own, trash.
2. Evenhanded Regulation
The monopolistic market participation described in the previous
paragraphs has not been wholly implemented in any state 8" and
accordingly has little case law to evaluate it. On the other hand,
challenges to facially evenhanded regulation are a mainstay of the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause diet. The state's goal is to have any such
regulation evaluated under the more lenient Pike standard rather than the
virtual per se rule of invalidity associated with discriminatory mea-
sures2
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 214-15 (1978).
9 Cf. supra note 282 (dealing with Delaware provisions); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
38, §§ 1310-X, 2156 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for no new commercial landfills and
no expansion of existing facilities except to contiguous land).
' See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing Philadelphia's two-tiered
analysis). Since the per se rule applies to measures which discriminate on their face
andor in effect, there is room in the Court's current dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence for significant argument about whether a facially neutral statute which has
disparate impact should be subjected to Pike balancing or to heightened scrutiny.
Compare Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that challenged provisions regulating the transported disposal of
municipal waste had the practical effect of discriminating against interstate commerce)
with Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 405 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the less




The easy cases for upholding state waste regulation involve clearly
evenhanded measures which do not produce disparate impacts. For
instance, a requirement that all municipal solid waste disposed of in-state
be deposited only in landfills with double liners might deter out-of-state
waste to some extent by driving up the cost of waste disposal, but these
regulations equally would drive up costs for all in-state generators.
Similarly, an absolute ban on in-state landfilling is the most obviously
constitutional way to deter out-of-state waste. The Commerce Clause does
not promote any absolute right to build landfills" or to build landfills
only of a certain type.
a. Treating Waste Differently Based on Type or Content
More serious Commerce Clause challenges arise when a state
regulates so that impacts are felt more harshly by out-of-staters than by
in-state interests. However, Philadelphia explicitly leaves open regulating
more harshly, including banning, based on the type rather than the origin
29 In this regard, Eastern Kentucky Resources v. Fiscal Court, No. 94-62 (E.D. Ky.
filed Aug. 9, 1994), bears watching to see if the judiciary will properly resist industry
efforts to impale evenhanded regulatory efforts because of previously less-than-pure local
motives. That controversy, arising in Magoffin County, involves local resistance to a
proposed mega-landfill designed to take primarily out-of-state waste. After several fiscal
court changes of vote, heavy local political pressure, and Cabinet insistence that Magoffin
County adopt a local plan stating whether there would or would not be local authorization
for large-scale disposal capacity, the Magoffm Fiscal Court adopted a plan which
authorized no new in-area disposal capacity.
The clear intent of the plan was to stop the proposed landfill in its tracks. However,
the local plan prohibited any new landfill from setting up shop in Magoffin County,
regardless of its proposed sources or methods of operation. In short, the Magoffin County
measure under attack, while motivated by partisan political pressures, is an evenhanded
regulatory measure which should provide a fairly easy case for upholding deference to
legitimate local purpose (the desire to prohibit the deleterious activity of landfilling) under
established dormant Commerce Clause precedents. See also, e.g., Al Turi Landfill, Inc.
v. Town of Goshen, 556 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that a local zoning
regulation which curtails disposal capacity is constitutional).
The spurned landfill plaintiffs in the Magoffin County case detail numerous examples
of local political favoritism and pressure, point to probable unconstitutionality of other
statutes, and emphasize early Special Session motivation to keep out out-of-state waste
as purported proof that they have been unconstitutionally harmed. In the end, however,
all that is relevant is whether the particular statutes at issue - the provisions of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes which empower a local government to decide for itself how
much landfilling it wants to take \place within the community - and the particular plan
adopted pursuant to those statutes are constitutional. Magoffin County's evenhanded ban
does not violate the Commerce Clause.
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of waste?2 To resist imposition of the heightened scrutiny test, the
regulating government must be able to prove that the regulation accom-
plishes a legitimate local purpose which only incidentally (ie., as a result
of accomplishing the local purpose) affects out-of-state commerce.
One such type of local regulatory measure apparently authorizede 3
but not yet seriously implemented under Kentucky statutes is to ban
waste which could be recycled. At least three related reasons exist why
bans on recyclables have not been enthusiastically embraced. First, in
order to get recyclables out of local waste, government would have to
expend considerable funds and effort. Second, mere allegations of
differences in quality of out-of-area waste would not be sufficient to keep
it out; serious inspection and enforcement efforts for both in- and out-of-
state waste would have to be undertaken to demonstrate difference.
Finally, even if local waste quality differences could be achieved and
demonstrated relative to some out-of-area waste, local waste would not
be superior to all out-of-area waste; much out-of-area waste would and
should be able to get through local bans based on quality or type. In sum,
regulating against type of waste is neither an easy nor a costless solution
to the burdens imposed by out-of-state waste, which is precisely what
demonstrates its constitutionality.
b. Rigorous Regulation, with Differential Impact
An example of rigorous evenhanded regulation which similarly should
survive scrutiny is the manifest requirements of section 224.43-335 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes. Under these provisions, all waste, regardless
of origin, must be accompanied by information about its geographic
source, type, prior handling, and weight and by certification that no
illegal waste knowingly was introduced into the waste.' Waste which
has travelled greater distance or through more hands may have to be
accompanied by more information, but the measure still significantly
burdens in-state waste transporters. When a state thus imposes real
burdens on in-state as well as out of-state waste, it must seriously weigh
whether the regulation is worth the costs involved. In fact, these
Kentucky manifest provisions have not been implemented.' One
See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27, 629.
See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.10-610, .43-345(1)(g) (Baldwin 1992).
See id. § 224.43-335.
2" See KENTJCKY NATuRAL RESOURCES & ENvTL. PROTECTION CAIE,
RECYCLING ISSUES PAPER FOR 1994 PROPOSED LEGISLATION 29-31 (Nov. 1993) (stating,
without significant explanation, that a manifest system for solid waste is unwananted and
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possible explanation for non-implementation is potential resistance to
these real costs by local interests.
What this means for Kentucky and other states wishing constitutional-
ly to deter waste burdens is that regulation affecting out-of-state interests
cannot be costless in regard to in-state interests and hope to survive
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Several types of regulation whichimpose real costs on local citizens but may impose incidentally greater
costs on particular out-of-state waste interests can be imagined. Require-
ments that waste trucks be pre-registered before they transport waste to
in-state facilities, 6 that drivers receive training in how to identify
improper waste, that waste trucks be limited to carrying only waste or
construction type materials, 7 or that those who are involved in the
waste business undergo rigorous background checks"s before being
allowed to transport waste would all require industry to identify and
dedicate personnel to the waste transportation enterprise. Out-of-state
interests could not economically engage in one-shot or impromptu
brokered hauls under such requirements, but neither could local disposers.
Out-of-state backhaulers would stand to lose more potential profits by a
dedicated fleet requirement than local haulers (because of the hauling
distances involved), but the dedication requirement would impose real
costs on insiders as well. The central question which should be asked of
such requirements is whether the enactments really serve a legitimate
local purpose. Making sure that responsible personnel engage in waste
hauling and that one can identify in advance who will be involved in
hauling seems rationally related to the legitimate concern that trash be
properly handled. Preventing foodstuffs or consumer goods from being
carried in vehicles which have carried waste seems rationally related to
has not been implemented, and additionally recommending that the statute requiring
manifest systems be repealed).
Cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174-450(4) (Baldwin Supp. 1993) (prohibiting the
unlicensed operation of vehicles for the transportation of municipal solid waste).
Cf Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th
Cir. 1992) (considering an Indiana statute that provided for limitations on the type of
cargo carried by waste trucks as effectively requiring the use of semi-dedicated vehicles
when transporting waste to Indiana).
2" See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.41, .42 (Anderson Supp. 1992)
(requiring an applicant to, inter alia, file a disclosure statement and submit to an
investigative report); cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.40-330 (Baldwin 1992) (requiring
a disclosure statement but no investigation). The background check required by § 224.40-
330 is being defended against constitutional attack in Atwoods of North America, Inc. v.
Kentucky Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Cabinet, No. 93-CI-01873
(Franklin Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 23, 1993).
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health and safety concerns. Proof of legitimate purpose is provided in
shortcut fashion by demonstrating that the regulation very seriously
burdens the state's own.
Once the court has determined that the regulation does serve a
legitimate local purpose, the Pike test requires that the opponent of the
regulation demonstrate burdens on interstate commerce that clearly exceed
the governmental benefits. For the examples considered above, it is
hard to see why allowing anyone to transport waste in any type of vehicle
without prior registration and/or background investigation is necessary to
the nation's survival. An admittedly closer case is presented by an
outriglt ban on backhauling.3°  The main point, however, is that
evenhanded measures which truly burden the state's own should be
presumed valid. The Pike test is properly deferential to evenhanded
regulatory measures which really regulate rather than just pretend to do
SO.
CONCLUSION: STATES SHOULD REGULATE
EVENHANDEDLY AND/OR AT REAL COST IN ORDER
TO SURVIVE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ATTACKS
The political pressures and externalities associated with waste disposal
mean that state and local governments will continue to attempt to find
ways to manage their own trash without becoming dumping grounds for
others' burdens. Although the U.S. Supreme Court's articulations of its
various Commerce Clause tests seem increasingly protective of vested
economic interests and skeptical of state motivations, there is still room
within current dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence for states to
regulate out-of-state waste without violating the Constitution. Legitimate
state efforts which are neither pretexts for discrimination nor shortcuts to
imposing real burdens on the state's own citizens should be upheld. Waste
industry does not have a vested right to an unregulated market. The
regulatory solutions most likely to survive Commerce Clause scruti-
ny - market participation, subsidized differences in quality, evenhanded
rigorous regulation - impose real costs on the government implementing
them and require states to deal with health and safety problems not only
in word but in common sense practical terms. Kentucky and other states
' See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1979).
31 The possibility of easily implemented but potentially less burdensome alternatives,
such as required sanitizing of vehicles which had previously carried trash, would need to
be evaluated. If the opponent could demonstrate these alternatives to be clearly less
burdensome, then it seems under the Pike test that a ban would be unconstitutional.
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wishing to regulate in the area without having their efforts declared
unconstitutional should focus only on such methods of waste regulation
until and unless the Court changes the dormant Commerce Clause ground
mles.

